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THE SAUDI SECURITIES LAW: 
REGULATION OF THE TADAWUL 
STOCK MARKET, ISSUERS, 
AND SECURITIES PROFESSIONALS 
UNDER THE SAUDI CAPITAL  
MARKET LAW OF 2003 
GOUDA, BUSHRA ALI GOUDA∗,∗∗  
ABSTRACT 
On July 31, 2003, the late King Fahd of Saudi Arabia issued Royal 
Decree number M/3, officially announcing the constitutive law of the 
securities industry, the Capital Market Law, and leading the Saudi 
Kingdom into new territory: capital market regulation. For Saudi 
businessmen, as well as many attorneys, the question “what are securities 
laws?” is a fair one. Securities laws are the body of rules that regulate 
certain subjects and issues pertinent to trade in securities, such as the 
registration and listing of companies in the stock market, securities 
professionals, the operation of the securities markets, the regulation of 
investment companies, and public offering of stock. Despite the fact that 
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almost nine years have passed since the enactment of the Capital Market 
Law, not one comprehensive legal paper has been submitted to explain or 
discuss the law. This Article attempts to do so by outlining the law of 
securities relating to securities professionals as laid out in the Capital 
Market Law and other statutes. Professionals’ fiduciary duties and other 
legal obligations imposed, such as their duties to the market and their 
clients, are extensively discussed. Moreover, this article gives a detailed 
account of the process of offering stock in the Saudi market. 
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND THE SYSTEM OF 
SECURITIES IN THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA 
In 2003, while the international stock markets were doing well, King 
Fahd of Saudi Arabia issued Royal Decree number M/3, promulgating 
the constitutive law of the securities industry, the Capital Market Law1 
(hereinafter CML), and ushering the Saudi's Kingdom into new a area:2 
securities laws and regulations. Securities regulation scholars have long 
considered securities law as consumer protection law because it aims to 
achieve the same goals of other consumer protection statutes. As such, 
the Capital Market Law is a consumer protection statute. Here, the 
consumer is the investor or the public at large, while the consumed are 
the financial products. The Saudi CML is preceded by a few statutes 
aimed at consumer protection. The most important of these are the Law 
Against Deception in Trade of 1984,3 the Rules Regulating 
Advertisements of 1992,4 and the Competition Law of 2004.5 While the 
idea of consumer protection is not new to the Saudi Kingdom, the 
enactment of the Capital Market Law is a big leap into the protection of 
capital market participants. This article focuses on securities laws in the 
context of the Saudi stock market exchange, “Tadawul.” In particular, it 
explains the law of securities as laid out in the Capital Market Law and 
its implementing statutes and regulations. More specifically, it outlines 
  
 1. The name “Capital Market Law” is commonly used as a generic name for the securities 
laws. For example, Egypt, Oman, Turkey, Indonesia, and Uruguay use the same name. The Royal 
Decree promulgating Saudia Arabia’s CML is dated July 31, 2003.  
 2. See Abdulrahman A. Al-Twaijry, Saudi Stock Market Historical View and Crisis Effect: 
Graphical and Statistical Analysis, 1-3, available at http://www.slideshare.net/Zorro29/saudi-stock-
market-historical-view-and-crisis-effect (giving a brief history of the Saudi stock market and its 
development and discussing its recent changes. The author also recommends further research on the 
cultural impact on the stock market). 
 3. Law Against Deception in Trade, Royal Decree No. M/11, 29/05/1404H (Jan. 3, 1984) 
(also prohibiting certain fraudulent and deceptive acts, mainly in the context of the sale of goods).  
 4. Rules Regulating Advertisements, Royal Decree No. M/35, 28/12/1412H (June 28, 1992) 
(calling for accurate and honest advertisements).  
 5. Competition Law, Royal Decree No. M/25, 4/5/1425H (June 22, 2004) (requiring the 
notification of the Board of competition sixty days prior to the offering of any securities). This law is 
in line with the Capital Market Law, which requires in the Mergers and Acquisition Regulations, 
Article 16, the compliance of an offer with the rules of the Competition Law. 
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and discusses the rules regulating the offer of securities, securities 
professionals, and the securities market. Currently, including the Capital 
Market Law, there are eleven statutes in this area: Anti-Money 
Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Rules,6 Merger and 
Acquisition Regulations,7 Real Estate Investment Funds Regulations,8 
Corporate Governance Regulations,9 Investment Funds Regulations,10 
Offers of Securities Regulations,11 Listing Rules,12 Securities Business 
Regulations,13 Authorized Persons Regulations14 and Market Conduct 
Regulations.15 These are also called implementing rules because, in their 
entirety, they are structured as a framework or a mechanism for the 
enforcement and the implementation of the constitutive law, the Capital 
Market Law. 
Although the CML regulates the entire securities market in the Kingdom, 
it is primarily directed at the public offering of securities. The CML 
requires the full disclosure of all securities when first made publicly 
available and before offering to the public. Not only that, the Capital 
Market Authority (hereinafter the “Authority” or “CMA”)16 conducts a 
review and demands that applicants make full disclosure prior to 
approving the listing of a security. The theory behind review and full 
disclosure is that investors receive accurate information before they 
make a decision to invest in new securities and that only good securities 
are offered in the Tadawul market. Moreover, the CML requires listed 
companies to make periodical reports and updates of their financial and 
managerial developments with the Authority. Disclosure, whether it is 
initial or continuous, is significant for two reasons. First, for those who 
want to subscribe to newly offered securities, it gives them the chance to 
make an informed decision and in the meantime, makes them feel that 
the Authority is there for them and is guarding them against any 
unscrupulous business. Further, the Authority is in a position to reject 
any offering of securities that is risky or meritless. This process, 
seemingly, assures investors that only good securities are being offered 
  
 6. Board of the Capital Market Authority Resolution No. 1-39-2008, 3/12/1429H (Jan. 12, 
2008) [hereinafter CMA Board Resolution]. 
 7. Id. No. 1-50-2007, 21/9/1428H (Mar. 10, 2007). 
 8. Id. No. 1-193-2006, 19/6/1427H (July 15, 2006). 
 9. Id. No. 1-212-2006, 21/10/1427AH (Dec. 11, 2006) (amended by CMA Board Resolution 
No. 1-1-2009, 8/1/1430H (May 1, 2009)). 
 10. Id. No. 1-219-2006, 3/12/1427H (Dec. 24, 2006). 
 11. Id. No. 2-11-2004, 20/8/1425H (April 10, 2004) (amended by CMA Board Resolution No. 
1-28-2008, 17/8/1429H (Aug. 18, 2008)). 
 12. CMA Board Resolution, supra note 6, No. 2-128-2006, 2/12/1426H (Jan. 22, 2006). 
 13. Id. No. 2-83-2005, 21/05/1426H (June 28, 2005). 
 14. Id. No. 1-83-2005, 21/05/1426H (June 28, 2005). 
 15. Id. No. 1-11-2004, 20/8/1425H (April 10, 2004). 
 16. The first CMA was appointed by Royal Decree No. M/30, 2/6/1424H (Jan. 2, 2004). 
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in the Tadawul market. Second, for those who have already subscribed to 
active or listed securities, the periodic reporting requirement functions as 
an accountability and feedback system, assuring investors that their 
investments are protected.  
Under the CML’s listing requirement, the prospective offering company 
must file an initial disclosure document—known as a “prospectus”—
created by a team of professionals consisting of accountants, advisors, 
the issuer’s management, and underwriters.17 A prospectus is defined as 
“communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any 
security for sale or confirms the sale of any security.”18 The prospectus is 
posted or distributed to potential investors. Usually, a copy of it is 
published in a booklet and made handedly available to investors. It is 
also published at the Capital Market Authority’s website. While neither 
the CML nor the Implementing Regulations, substantively, define the 
prospectus, the Glossary of Terms defines it as “the document required to 
offer securities in accordance with the Capital Market Law and Listing 
Rules.”19 The prospectus and other statutorily required documents must 
be filed before any public sale of securities can take place. For potential 
investors, they must receive the prospectus after approval by the 
Authority and prior to the sale date.20 If the prospectus is approved, an 
offer of securities could be made through the prospectus itself, verbally, 
through an announcement containing a summary of the prospectus or 
through electronic media.21 After filing the prospectus and the required 
documents, and once the issuer’s application is approved, a registration 
of all securities must take place. Registration is done with the Capital 
Market Authority.22 There is a waiting period, during which the 
Authority reviews the filing for completeness. The most significant rule 
to remember is that if the prospectus has not been approved by the CMA, 
there is no publication of the prospectus; thus, no offer and consequently 
no sale of securities can take place.  
  
 17. Lawyers act as technicians and consultants in the writing of the prospectus. However, they 
are not securities professionals under the CML rules. 
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) (2006). The CML does not define prospectus, but a definition-type 
wording could be gleaned from the provision of Article 40(c). 
 19. Board of the Capital Market Authority, Glossary Of Defined Terms Used in the 
Regulations and Rules of the Capital Market Authority, 16, available at http://www.sukuk-
compliance.com/u/G2.2%20CMA%20Glossary.pdf [hereinafter CMA Rules Glossary]. 
 20. Capital Market Law, art. 41 (Saudia Arabia), available at http://www.cma.org.sa/ 
En/AboutCMA/CMALaw/Documents/CAPITAL%20MARKET%20LAW-26-8-009.pdf [hereinafter 
CML]. 
 21. CML, supra note 20, art. 40(c). Note that electronic and other media offers must be 
approved in advance by the CMA. 
 22. The phrases “Authority”, “Capital Market Authority”, and “the Board”, and the 
abbreviation “CMA” are interchangeably used to mean the Board of the Capital Market Authority. 
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The Capital Market Law neither allows injured investors to bring civil 
suits in civil courts against other investors or other subjects regulated by 
it, nor does it allow disputants to adjudicate their securities cases in the 
Kingdom’s traditional judiciary system. However, the CML contains 
remedies for injured investors through the CMA’s judicial bodies: the 
Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD) and its 
Appeal Panel. The law is clear as to whether the CRSD and the Appeal 
Panel’s decisions are reviewable by ordinary courts or higher judicial 
authorities—they are not. This means once the case has reached the 
Appeal Panel from the CRSD, it has exhausted all the available remedies 
under the Kingdom’s system. At this point, the case becomes, more or 
less, akin to a res judicata case in the common law system.   
The CML also contains antifraud provisions that bar fraud, manipulation, 
omissions and misrepresentations in connection with the sale and 
offering of securities. According to Article 55, issuers, senior officers, 
and underwriters are strictly liable for material misleadings or false 
statements appearing in their registration or prospectus.23 The Authority 
initiates investigations on its own or by complaint. Thereafter, it decides 
whether to bring charges in front of the CRSD against alleged violators. 
Since 2006, the Authority has prosecuted a tremendous amount of 
cases.24  
Under the CML proceedings, all evidence is admissible in any form. 
Moreover, evidence can be obtained without warrant or an order from a 
judge or a prosecutor, and all the civil rights granted to criminal suspects 
under Criminal Procedure law of 24/08/1422H, corresponding to Jan. 24, 
2004, Section 3-5 are in jeopardy if a person violates the CML.25  
In the event of a dispute between investors, they have to pursue their 
remedies through the Authority as well. Pursuant to Article 25 of the 
CML, investors first must file their complaint with the Authority and 
wait ninety days after the filing.26 After the expiration of the ninety days 
and prior to the lodging of the complaint, the complainant is given a 
notice informing him that he is allowed to file the complaint with the 
CRSD or otherwise.  
  
 23. CML, supra note 20, art. 55(b). 
 24. There are no publicly known records for these cases. However, the Annual Reports of 
2007-2009 point to the prosecution of more than one thousand cases. 
 25. Here, a due process question may arise because people can be searched, detained, 
interrogated and their rights can be violated during these processes. 
 26. CML, supra note 20, art. 25(e).  
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For all suits or actions arising from violations of the CML transparency 
or disclosure rules, the statute of limitations for bringing such a suit or an 
action is no more than five years after the occurrence of the violation.27 
The period is the same for actions, the causes of which ensue from 
breach of the CML prohibition against unfair, manipulative or deceptive 
practices, or any of the actions prohibited by Articles 49 and 50.28 The 
statute of limitations for an action the cause of which arises from 
violations to Article 55, 56, or 57 is one year from the date when the 
“claimant should reasonably have been aware of facts causing him to 
believe he had been the victim of a violation”, i.e., the date of 
discovery.29 Notably, the CML cannot be stalled; in other words, there is 
no tolling. It does not provide incidents in which the statute of limitations 
can be extended for more than five years. Moreover, there are no cases 
on this point. 
Tolling is significant in two situations. One, in a continuous crime, such 
as continuous fraud that is perpetrated by an offeror against an investor at 
some point in time. According to the CML, if the investor/victim does 
not discover the crime within the five year period, his right to file a suit 
is forever forfeited. This could happen despite the fact that the crime and 
its effects are ongoing. Two, in a sophisticated crime, the perpetrator is 
so sophisticated to the degree the victim cannot discover the crime or the 
transaction that caused the crime soon enough, e.g., a security that 
matures after more than five years. By default, an investor in an 
instrument that matures after more than five years will likely not 
discover the crime within five years if the perpetrator is aware of what he 
is doing or if he hides the evidence. Moreover, it is not uncommon in 
stock market business for criminals to cook the books, and as such, they 
can hide their crime for decades. At least in these two scenarios, the 
CML should have provided an exception to toll the statute of limitations.  
Part I introduced the securities system in the Saudi Kingdom with a brief 
historical introduction to 20th century legal developments in the area of 
consumer protection in the Kingdom. It also outlined the legal 
framework that governs the securities industry in the Saudi Kingdom. 
Part II discusses the role of the Capital Market Authority, the entity 
tasked with administering the securities laws in the Kingdom. In Part III, 
the basic issues pertinent to the law of securities are adequately 
  
 27. Id. art. 58. The statute of limitations is similar to Taqadum/“lapse of time” in Arabic. If the 
suit is not filed by that date, then the complainant is forever barred from suing.  
 28. In general, Article 49, among other things, prohibits inside trading, fraudulent transactions, 
creating false impressions, and misrepresentations that affect the market or the participants thereof.  
 29. CML, supra note 20, art. 58. 
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discussed: jurisdiction under the Capital Market Law, the definition of 
‘securities’ in Saudi Law compared to that of the American Securities 
Act of 1933, admission into the Tadawul market and regulation of public 
and private offerings of securities in the Kingdom, and the requirements 
for offering and registering securities. Brief comparison with the 
American system is conducted throughout this part and the following. 
Other fundamental legal issues that might arise from the definition of 
securities are highlighted and further explained. Part IV discusses the 
regulation of the Tadawul Market, issuers, and securities professionals 
under the Capital Market Law with comparison to the Securities Act of 
1933. This part also addresses the transparency rules and violations of 
said rules. Part V concerns liabilities and remedies for violations of the 
Capital Market Law in general, and in particular, violations of the 
transparency rules. Part VI reaches the conclusion: although the CML is 
a very sophisticated body of law, it has a fundamental problem; that is, 
the CML was literally copied from the American system with no regard 
to the realities of the Saudi legal system. 
A caveat must be mentioned here; despite the fact that the norms about to 
be discussed were sophisticatedly enacted, there either has not been any 
case law or the research for this Article did not yield any case worth 
discussing. This is due to several factors. First, stare decisis—the system 
of precedence—is not that attractive to the Saudis. Second, the legal 
profession and the formal judicial system in the Kingdom are still 
developing. Third, Saudi Arabian judges are given broad discretionary 
powers, and the use of such powers renders the judges’ need for a statute 
or precedent of little importance. Even in the area we are about to 
venture into, one may find that the law, in many instances, leaves the 
matter that is settled in western jurisprudences and jurisdictions wide 
open to the decision maker. In some areas, one may get the sense that 
this “whole thing” of discretion makes the law subject to the whim of the 
individual who is making the decision. How unfortunate it is, but this is 
the reality. 
II. THE CAPITAL MARKET AUTHORITY  
The Capital Market Authority is similar to the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) in the American Securities system, yet 
tremendously more powerful. It was established by the CML, and its 
powers and mandate are found in Section 2 of the law. It is fundamental 
in administering the securities laws. Looking squarely at the agency’s 
function, one could safely say this agency is empowered to do almost 
68
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anything with respect to the stock exchange market;30 it has police power, 
oversight power, legislative power and a judicial role as well.31 For day-
to-day operation of the Tadawul market, the CML has created a joint 
company called Saudi Stock Exchange (SSE).32 SSE is the sole entity in 
the Kingdom authorized to carry out trading in Securities.33 Article 20(c) 
lists the objectives of the exchange, which are essentially the same 
objectives of the Authority.34     
While the CMA could do almost anything with respect to the stock 
market in the Kingdom (by virtue of Article 4 of the CML), it cannot 
engage in any of the following activities:  
• commercial activities;  
• having a special interest in any project intended for profit; and 
• lending any funds, acquiring, owning or issuing any 
Securities.35 
Similar to the SEC, the CMA has a five member board,36 called 
Commissioners.37 The members are appointed by a Royal Decree for a 
  
 30. See CML, supra note 20, art. 4(a). The text reads “[a]n Authority to be named “The Capital 
Market Authority” is hereby established in the Kingdom and shall directly report to the President of 
the Council of Ministers. It shall have a legal personality and financial and administrative autonomy. 
It shall be vested with all authorities as may be necessary to discharge its responsibilities and 
functions under this Law. The Authority shall enjoy exemptions and facilities enjoyed by public 
organizations. Its personnel shall be subject to the Labor Law.” 
 31. See id. art. 2(e). Subsection (e) gives the CMA the power to determine what instruments 
should be considered securities. Not only that, it gives this broad discretionary power to the CMA to 
admit or exclude any instrument from the definition if the Board believes it would further the safety 
of the market (“… any other rights or instruments which the Board determines should be included or 
treated as Securities if the Board believes that this would further the safety of the market or the 
protection of investors. The Board can exercise its power to exempt from the definition of Securities 
rights or instruments that otherwise would be treated as Securities under paragraphs (a, b, c, d) of 
this Article if it believes that it is not necessary to treat them as Securities, based on the requirements 
of the safety of the market and the protection of investors”). This section gives the CMA the power 
to interpret the law; a truly judicial function to determine what falls under the term “securities”. See 
Part II of this Article for more discussion on this point. 
 32. The Board of the Exchange consists of nine members: one from the ministry of finance, 
one from the ministry of commerce and industry, one from the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency 
(SAMA), four from licensed brokerage companies, and two from joint stock companies listed on the 
Exchange. Id. art. 22(b). 
 33. Id. art. 20(a). 
 34. See, e.g., id. art. 23(a)(5) (empowering the Exchange to settle disputes between members 
and between members and their clients). In fact, all the powers exercised by the Exchange in Article 
23, by default, are powers originally granted to the CMA by the CML. 
 35. Id. art. 4(b). 
 36. CML, supra note 20, art. 7(a). 
 37. The sitting CMA Board, as of May 2010, is chaired by Dr. Abdulrahman A. Al-Tuwaijri 
and four Commissioners, deputy chairman Mr. Abdulrahman Al-Rashed, Mr. Mohammed Al-
Shumrani, Mr. Mazin A. AlRomaih, and Dr. Abdulrahman M. AlBarrak. Capital Market Authority, 
2008 Annual Report 7, available at http://www.cma.org.sa/En/Publicationsreports/Reports/ 
CMA2008.pdf [hereinafter 2008 CMA Annual Report]. 
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five year term, renewable once.38 The Decree specifies from the members 
who is to be the chairman and who the deputy.39 The CMA Board is 
headquartered in Riyadh, with five main departments or offices: the 
chairman’s office, legal affairs, the internal audit office, office of the 
general secretariat, and public relations.40 These five main offices are 
assisted by twenty-eight sub-offices that have various functions: 
administrative, regulatory, research, supervision of the market, and 
investigation, i.e., the housekeeping work. Basically, the CMA carries its 
mandate and exercises its power through these offices and sub-offices. 
The CMA answers to the prime minister.  
Since the CML anticipated amounting administrative responsibilities 
ensuing from the task of administering it, it established the CMA to be 
the official agency responsible of administering this law and regulating 
all aspects of public trading of securities. The CMA’s role is carried out 
in various ways: (a) through a direct regulatory role and rulemaking 
power; (b) via supervision of trading, disclosure, violations, and 
investors’ complaints (an administrative role); (c) by making sure 
participants comply with initial and continuous disclosure requirements; 
and (d) through investor awareness. 
A. DIRECT REGULATORY ROLE AND RULEMAKING POWER 
The CMA has issued, so far, ten statutes. These statutes cover the entire 
securities market personnel, transactions, traders, brokers, etc., in the 
Tadawul market.41 Moreover, besides the brokers and advisors, these 
regulations cover proxy solicitations, real estate transactions, corporate 
governance, and purchasers of securities, and they also impose 
disclosure, reporting, and other duties on publicly-held corporations. 
This direct regulatory role is one of the CMA’s pivotal functions; it 
enables it to control the entire securities market by making binding rules 
that affect:  
• Listed and perspective companies; 
• Authorized persons and securities professionals; 
• Tadawul; and 
• Traders 
  
 38. CML, supra note 20, art. 7(b). 
 39. Id. art. 7(a). 
 40. 2008 CMA Annual Report, supra note 37, at 18. 
 41. See supra notes 6-15. 
69
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B. SUPERVISION OF TRADING, DISCLOSURE, VIOLATIONS, AND 
INVESTORS’ COMPLAINTS (ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE) 
Since the CMA is the default administrative agency tasked with 
enforcing the CML, it basically functions as an administrative court in 
both proceedings initiated on its own and in proceedings between private 
parties. Therefore, besides its rule-making power, the CMA does a 
number of things that achieve the goal of administering the law, such as: 
• Receives investors’ complaints;  
• Follows-up and monitors violations of the CML and its 
Implementing Regulations and of the decisions and directives 
issued by the CMA Commissioners; 
• Investigates issues referred to it by the competent departments 
relating to violations of the Capital Market Law or arising 
from investors’ complaints; 
• Brings legal proceedings before the Committee for Resolution 
of Securities Disputes against any party violating the Capital 
Market Law and its Implementing Regulations;  
• Makes daily market activity reports;42 and 
• Follows-up on the implementation of the decisions and 
verdicts issued by the CMA board or the CRSD. 
Each of the powers to exercise any of the aforementioned functions is 
either derived directly from Article 5 of the CML or the implementing 
statutes that were enacted by the CMA itself.  
C. MAKING SURE PARTICIPANTS COMPLY WITH INITIAL AND 
CONTINUOUS DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 
1. Initial Disclosure 
As mentioned, the CML requires all prospective companies that desire to 
conduct business in the Tadawul market to make available all the 
relevant information in a prospectus. The contents of the prospectus 
include sufficient information for investors about the offering company’s 
financial status, its affiliate, directors, securities issued, shareholders, etc. 
The prospectus has a significant role. Based on the information contained 
in it, potential investors make a decision to buy the stock of the company 
or otherwise. Therefore, if the information submitted to them is 
  
 42. In 2006-2007, it averaged over ten reports per day. Capital Market Authority, 2007 Annual 
Report 58, available at http://www.cma.org.sa/En/Publicationsreports/Reports/cma_report_2007.pdf 
[hereinafter 2007 CMA Annual Report]. 
10
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misleading or faulty, these investors can be tricked into investing in the 
company based on bad information and could eventually sustain 
substantial losses. Accordingly, the accuracy of the information in the 
prospectus is crucial. The CMA does not review the prospectus to 
ascertain the accuracy of the information therein; it only reviews it for 
completeness. However, according to Article 55(a), if the prospectus 
omitted or misstated information and the CMA approved it, and based on 
the information an investor bought the stock and sustained damages, he 
can always invoke Article 55(a) and claim his damages from the parties 
who wrote or signed the prospectus. No responsibility lies with the CMA 
despite the fact that it approved the offering of the stock without 
ascertaining the correctness of the information.43  
To what degree may an injured party invoke Article 55? The Article sets 
the test here: the injured party can claim his damages if the misstated or 
the omitted information that caused his losses is “material” and had the 
buyer been aware of the mistake or the omitted information, he would 
have offered a lower price than what he paid.44 Indeed, the information 
would also be considered material had the buyer been aware of it; it 
would have prevented him from buying the stock.45 
2. Continuous Disclosure 
This type of disclosure is made to ensure compliance of already listed 
companies in the Tadawul market with the CML and other rules. It is 
called “continuous” because it is an ongoing process; a listed company 
must file papers with the CMA as long as it is listed in the Tadawul 
market. Pursuant to this requirement, listed companies must disclose 
their annual and quarterly reports and fiscal statements, any change in 
capital that might affect the company’s wellbeing, changes of address, 
changes in the board of directors and senior executives, changes in 
  
 43. The CMA does not endorse statements by offerors or investors. In more than one 
provision, the CMA disclaims responsibility in the event of approving false or misleading 
information. The main disclaimer, which exonerates the CMA in case of faulty information in the 
prospectus, is found in CML, supra note 20, art. 48(b).  
 44. CML, supra note 20, art. 55(a) (“In case a prospectus, when approved by the Authority, 
contained incorrect statements of material matters or omitted material facts required to be stated in 
the prospectus, the person purchasing the Security that was the subject of such prospectus shall be 
entitled to compensation for the damages incurred by him as a result thereof. A statement or 
omission shall be considered material for the purposes of this paragraph if it is proven to the 
Committee that had the investor been aware of the truth when making such purchase it would have 
affected the purchase price”).   
 45. For more on the law of disclosure, see Part IV of this Article. 
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ownership of substantial shares, and changes in the company’s by-laws.46 
Every security listed in the Tadawul market must be continuously 
reported except those which were acquired by private placement. 
Violators of the continuous disclosure requirement may be disciplined or 
even sanctioned. In one case, the CMA fined a bank for failing to comply 
with the continuous reporting requirement.47 The Bank’s fault was that it 
did not inform the CMA as to the change in its management. In another 
case, the CMA fined a listed company for failing to report the decision to 
stop a factory operation.48 
D. INVESTOR AWARENESS 
Investor awareness is achieved by developing financial and economic 
research and studies, preparing the annual and other periodic reports, and 
issuing periodic awareness pamphlets and statistical and analytical 
reports on the Saudi Tadawul market.49 Also, the CMA disseminates 
information on the CMA website and media, and answers inquiries from 
concerned persons by phone, fax, email, etc. Despite the fact that one of 
the major goals of the Tadawul market is achieving transparency in 
transactions, the decisions of the CRSD are nowhere to be found. The 
CMA and CRSD are not open for independent researchers or inquiries 
regarding decisions issued by them. So far, the CRSD has disposed of 
hundreds of cases, but no one outside the circle of litigants or the judges 
themselves knows how things go inside the judges’ chamber. Few know 
the facts of the cases that come in the media in the form of news releases. 
This is considered one major flaw of the system because no one knows 
how the judges think or how they interpret the law, how they reason their 
decisions or under what section of the law the CMA prosecutes violators 
of the CML. The CMA and the CRSD decisions and investigation results 
are not published.50  
  
 46. See CML, supra note 20, art. 45 (mandating continuous disclosure, among other 
requirements). The reason for this reporting is to keep the listed company’s status updated for 
concerned persons.  
 47. See Khalil Hanware, CMA Fines 2 Listed Firms for Violation, ARAB NEWS, Apr. 5, 2010, 
available at http://arabnews.com/economy/article39204.ece (reporting that the bank was Aljazeera 
Bank). 
 48. Id. (reporting that the company was Advanced Petrochemical Company). 
 49. See 2007 CMA Annual Report, supra note 42, at 18. 
 50. The details and deliberations of the CMA and the CRSD decisions are published as news 
releases in the daily media or on the website. The way they are released is of little to no value for 
legal academicians. For example, one complete decision revoking the license of a firm issued by the 
Authority reads: “Under its resolution No. 11-9-2010 and due to several violations of the Capital 
Market Law and its Implementing Regulations, the CMA Board of Commissioners issued today 
Sunday 28/3/1431H corresponding to 14/3/2010 its decision to revoke the license granted to Ernst & 
Young Saudi Arabia Consulting Limited based on the Capital Market Law issued by the Royal 
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III. JURISDICTION, DEFINITION OF SECURITIES, AND OFFER 
AND ADMISSION INTO THE TADAWUL MARKET UNDER 
THE CAPITAL MARKET LAW  
A. JURISDICTION UNDER THE CAPITAL MARKET LAW 
The Capital Market Law applies to transactions involving securities that 
are listed or about to be listed in the Tadawul market. Thus, the subject 
matter jurisdiction of the CML is securities and the geographical limit of 
this law is the boundaries of the Saudi Kingdom. If any violation of the 
CML occurs within the Kingdom, naturally, the CMA or the Saudi 
authorities have jurisdiction over the violation. According to Article 
20(b), securities listed or traded in a regulated market outside the 
Kingdom are not subject to the provisions of the CML even if trading in 
such a market originates within the Kingdom.  
However, the CML has an overreaching provision with respect to 
personal jurisdiction over violations for foreign law that took place in a 
foreign country. To make this point clear, if a person violates foreign 
laws and the same person does business in the Kingdom, such a person is 
subject to the provisions of Article 62(a)(4), according to which the 
Authority has jurisdiction to suspend the license of such a person or his 
agent for twelve months, if the Authority has been formally notified by 
foreign regulators. The provision of Article 62(a)(4) was rather built on 
an unsound ground because the Authority cannot make the suspension if 
it has not been “formally” notified by a securities regulator in another 
country that the person or his agent willfully violated the securities laws 
of a foreign jurisdiction.  
The unsoundness comes from the fact that the Authority has to be 
“formally” notified by the foreign authorities in order to effectuate 
provision 62(a)(4). A question arises as to what the CML means by 
“formal” notice. It is not clear whether a judgment against a violator of a 
foreign law constitutes a “formal notice” for the purposes of the CML. 
From the face of the statute, the answer is no. If not, the publication of 
such a judgment in legal reports or the media may still be a notice, but it 
does not constitute a notice as specified by the statute.   
  
Decree No. (M/30) dated on 02/06/1424H, and the Authorized Persons Regulations issued by CMA 
Board of Commissioners on their Resolution No. 1-83-2005 dated on 21/5/1426H corresponding to 
28/6/2005. The CMA had authorized Ernst & Young Saudi Arabia Consulting Limited to conduct 
Arranging & Advising activities in the securities business under resolution No. 2–174-2006 dated on 
22/4/1427H corresponding 20/5/2006.” Saudi Capital Market Authority Revokes Ernst & Young 
License (Mar. 15, 2010), available at http://www.complinet.com/global/news/news/article.html? 
ref=129983. This one paragraph decision says Ernst & Young violated the law but cites no provision 
and gives no reasoning. 
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It is reasonable to think that any credible notice of a violation should be 
considered a formal notice because the Authority will not get formal 
notices unless it has reciprocal agreements with foreign authorities. In 
some countries, even with the existence of reciprocal agreements, formal 
notices, as required by CML Article 62(a)(4), would be useless because 
either the country’s judicial system does not have a judgment reporting 
system or the privacy laws prohibit the transmission of information to 
foreign authorities. In this way, the formal notice requirement makes 
little sense.  
The provision should have been constructed to achieve a specific 
purpose; the apparent purpose of this provision is to bar dishonest 
persons and dishonest practices to ensure the safety of the Tadawul 
market. If this is the true purpose behind the statute, the Authority should 
not wait to obtain formal notice. Rather, it should act on any credible 
information it has or it could obtain by any means. Credible information 
should have been the test here, regardless of how the Authority obtains it. 
There is no apparent wisdom in tying the market safety to getting 
information from foreign jurisdictions. The official Arabic version of the 
statute also mentions formal notice and ignores credible notice or 
credible information. In sum, the use of the phrase “formal” notice 
renders the statute a bit narrower and contravenes the objectives of the 
law.  
B. DEFINITION OF SECURITIES 
A security is a negotiable instrument representing value in something 
else; it has no independent intrinsic value.51 One authority, in a quest to 
define the term, says “the statutory phrase investment contract captures 
the generic concept of what a security is, and interpretation of this phrase 
has provided basic guidelines for defining a security.”52 Investment 
contracts are the transactions in which one party commits his money to 
gain profit and the other lends labor or service. While the definition of 
investment contract sheds light on the term security, the truth is it does 
not define the term.  
Notwithstanding the existence of a proper definition, now all securities 
laws and regulations have a “statutory definition” which actually does 
not define the term security, but rather enumerates the types of securities 
under the law. These statutes were enacted, mainly, to cover three broad 
  
 51. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), available at Westlaw BLACKS. 
 52. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATIES ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 29 (3rd ed. 
1995); see also LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATIONS 
1013-1016 (5th ed. 2004).  
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categories of investment contracts or vehicles: (1) equity securities; (2) 
exchange-traded options; and (3) exchange-traded debt securities. Article 
2 of the CML is one such example. It does not define the term security, 
but it does, non-exhaustively, enumerate the types of securities 
recognized by the law. It states that “. . . for the purposes of this Law, the 
term “Securities” shall mean: 
a. convertible and tradeable shares of companies;  
b. Tradeable debt instruments issued by companies, the 
government, public institutions or public organisations;  
c. investment units issued by investment funds; 
d. any instruments representing profit participation rights, any 
rights in the distribution of assets; or either of the foregoing;   
e. any other rights or instruments which the Board determines 
should be included or treated as Securities if the Board believes 
that this would further the safety of the market or the protection 
of investors. The Board can exercise its power to exempt from 
the definition of Securities rights or instruments that otherwise 
would be treated as Securities under paragraphs (a, b, c, d) of 
this Article if it believes that it is not necessary to treat them as 
Securities, based on the requirements of the safety of the market 
and the protection of investors.53  
This may seem like such a long definition, but compared to other foreign 
statutes it is actually shorter.54 By way of example, compared to the U.S. 
1933 Securities Act’s definition, it fails to expressly mention several 
internationally recognized investment vehicles and instruments such as 
“put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national 
securities exchange relating to foreign currency, receipt for, guarantee 
of, or right to subscribe to or purchase.”55 While the CML does not 
expressly mention these instruments in the definition, almost everything 
is included in the Glossary of Terms; for equity securities there are 
stocks and convertibles, for puts and calls the law recognizes options, 
and for derivatives the law recognizes futures. Perhaps it is for this 
reason the Glossary of Terms56 further elaborates on the term security 
  
 53. CML, supra note 20, art. 2. 
 54. The CML is based on international standards; among them, the U.S. Securities Laws of 
1933 and 1934. See Al-Twaijry, supra note 2, at 3. 
 55. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2010) (emphasis added).  
 56. CMA Rules Glossary, supra note 19. It is notable that the Glossary of Terms has expanded 
the definition of security to include transactions that are not typically Shari“a compliant, such as 
futures and possibly credit swabs and derivatives. This may contravene Article 8 of the Offers of 
Securities Regulations, which requires the securities offered to be Saudi law compliant.  
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and outlines ten instruments, some of which were not mentioned in 
Article 2. These include:  
(1) shares; 
(2) debt instruments; 
(3) warrants; 
(4) certificates; 
(5) units; 
(6) options; 
(7) futures; 
(8) contracts for differences; 
(9) long term insurance contracts; and   
(10) any right to or interest in anything which is specified by the 
above.57 
Accordingly, this definition, ostensibly shorter, is not narrow because of 
the elaboration in the Glossary and more importantly, because subsection 
(e) is placed at the end of Article 2 as a “savior clause”. Subsection (e) 
allows the decision maker to consider any missing instruments and any 
other remotely related investment contracts as securities if this would 
further the objectives of the law. The overly broad wording of the clause 
allows the decision maker ample power to exclude or include what it sees 
fit in the definition. The clause restricts the exercise of this power to 
further the common good of the market. The question that begs 
answering is “how does the Commission, or, for this matter, any other 
judicial body determine whether a specific instrument is a security or 
not?” The answer is, based on the research conducted for this Article and 
the apparent Saudi practice, we do not know.   
However, since the CML is derived from international standards, one 
assumes that it follows these standards or at least is guided by them. One 
of these international standards that has heavily influenced the CML is 
the U.S. securities regulations. A U.S. court, in determining whether a 
specific transaction or instrument is a security or governed by the 
securities laws, first looks at whether the particular investment or 
instrument calls for investor protection under the securities laws. It is 
unclear how the court determines the investment calls for protection. To 
appreciate this point, we will discuss the leading precedent in defining 
investment contracts in the American System, SEC v. W.J. Howey.58 In 
Howey, the promoters sold an optional service agreement to the investors 
and one of the promoters’ affiliates would manage the trees and their 
  
 57. Id. at 4-5. 
 58. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). See also HAZEN, supra note 52, at 13-14. 
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fruits. About 85% of the buyers bought the optional service, which was 
managing the trees. The service agreement gave Howey’s affiliate a full 
possession of the plots. Investors were not expected to come to the plots 
and care for the trees themselves. Actually, it was impossible for an 
investor to do so; the investors did not have a right to access the plots, 
and it was not economically feasible to individually manage the plots.59 
Howey’s court stated that while the services offered by the promoters are 
not tied by contract, in reality they create security because they are 
attached to the property. From this case, a contract is an investment 
contract if a person:  
(1) invests his money; 
(2) in a common enterprise; 
(3) is led to expect profit; and  
(4) the profit comes “primarily” or “substantially” from the 
efforts of others. 
In essence, Howey’s standard is sort of a “totality of the economic 
circumstances” test because the court looks at the economic 
circumstances surrounding the contract or the investment as a whole and 
determines whether it should be treated as a security. No single factor is 
determinative in this test. However, it is clear that Howey’s test is not 
about defining security; the test determines whether an instrument is an 
investment contract, not whether the instrument fits within the examples 
in the definition of securities. The U.S. Supreme Court, years after it 
decided Howey, paid attention to this point. In the 1985 case Landreth 
Timber Co. v. Landreth, the Court focused on whether the investment 
contract in question fit within the definition of security. The Court noted 
that Howey’s totality of the economic circumstances test is good for 
defining investment contracts, but not good at defining whether these 
contracts fit within the examples listed in the statutory definition of 
security.60 One obvious reason for not applying Howey’s test, as the 
Court noted, was that it would render the “enumeration of many types of 
instruments in the definition superfluous.”61 In Landreth Timber the 
Court focused on the factual circumstances surrounding the investment. 
The Court emphasized two outcomes: (1) each of the financial 
instruments listed in the statutory definition of security is susceptible to a 
  
 59. HAZEN, supra note 52, at 13. 
 60. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 52, at 232. 
 61. Id. at 232-233. 
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separate analysis employing separate analytical concepts; and (2) there is 
no universal or generic test for the term ‘security.’62  
Going back to the CML’s definition, the statute does not define 
securities; it rather identifies certain schemes or transactions and gives 
them the statutory label “securities.” Thus, what is articulated by statute 
in Article 2 are the securities that the law recognizes. It is as though the 
legislator is saying, besides what is listed in Article 2(a)-(d), “we know 
what a security is when we see it.” This, in reality, does not mean a lot 
for a person sitting on a bench because actually there is no disagreement 
on all the types of securities listed in these subsections. Rather, the 
disagreement is on what has not been mentioned. To cover this pitfall the 
CML gave broad discretionary power to the CMA and the CRSD in 
subsection (e). Subsection (e) allows the Board to define the term 
security, and to exclude from, or include in the definition what it sees fit. 
The problem is that there is no published jurisprudence telling 
researchers what test is deployed in determining whether an instrument 
or a transaction falls within the ambit of the definition. Moreover, the 
statute does not point to any type of test the judge should deploy to make 
the call. It only sets this vague guidance, at the bottom—in the last 
sentence—of Article 2(e), which says: “based on the requirements of the 
safety of the market and the protection of investors the Board has the 
power to include or exclude from the definition what it believes to be or 
not to be a security.”63 However, if we considered the test for 
determining whether an instrument is a security as “safety of the 
market,” the totality of the economic or factual circumstances tests, 
articulated by the American courts, do not apply. The issue still stands, 
by the safety of the market test, that a judge will not be able to determine 
whether the instrument in question is a security or not.  
If we assume, arguendo, that the safety of the market is a test, it seems 
that the judge would have to exercise broad discretionary, perhaps 
arbitrary, power to make such a decision based on such a test. And here 
lies the dilemma, because apparently the safety of the market test is just a 
myth at worst and misconception at best. The CML’s “safety of the 
market” test is per se vague and normally cannot be seen as a test to 
make a determination on the nature of the note or the transaction. 
Furthermore, it appears that the coining of the phrase “safety of the 
market” is just a misconception because it mixes the end with the means. 
This is so because a test is a mechanism or a tool deployed to reach an 
outcome. Safety here is an outcome or a goal.  Safety of the market is 
  
 62. Id. at 232. 
 63. CML, supra note 20, art. (2)(e). 
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one of the CML’s goals, while identifying what constitutes a security is 
basically a jurisprudential question that must be answered by the court by 
using a test prior to making a decision. The judge should find a guide in 
the law or the jurisprudence to make this call. The CML assumes this 
guide is the safety of the market. The test should have been something 
similar to the totality of economical or factual circumstances surrounding 
the transaction or any other normative test.  
1. Instruments Not Subject to Securities Regulations 
Article 3 of the CML excludes from the definition of securities 
commercial papers such as checks, bills of exchange, order notes, 
documentary credits, money transfers, instruments exclusively traded 
among banks, and insurance policies.64 These, regardless of their secure 
or non-secure status, are statutorily excluded from being treated as 
securities. Article 3 exempts insurance policies from being treated as 
securities for the reasons outlined below. However, this provision does 
not exempt insurance company stock or other securities from such 
policies. If insurance companies are listed in the Tadawul market, they 
are subject to the provisions of the CML. Their bonds and other 
securities are regulated by the same provisions that apply to everyone in 
the Tadawul market. They must register, disclose and report like other 
participants. Therefore, in essence, Article 3 exemption is a transaction 
exemption, not a securities-type exemption.65  
The rationale for excluding insurance policies and the other items could 
be that these do not need the protection of the CML and that they are 
governed by other systems or regulations. In other words, these are 
mostly secured transactions and papers. Take checks issued by 
commercial banks as an example: banks themselves are supposedly 
insured or guaranteed by the Saudi Central Bank/Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Agency (SAMA) similarly to the way commercial banks are 
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the 
American System. 
Another rationale for excluding some of these items could be that these 
instruments are usually given in sale transactions or as securities for 
short term maturity transactions in which a party pays some kind of 
consideration for the unconditional promise of the other to pay.66 For a 
  
 64. Id. art. 3. 
 65. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 52, at 234.  
 66. The CMA defines commercial papers as “a debt instrument creating or acknowledging 
indebtedness that has a maturity of less than one year from the date of issue.” CMA Rules Glossary, 
supra note 19, at 17. It must be noted that this definition is extracted from the American Law. 
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holder in due course, these bills are as good as money; thus, there is no 
need to protect these bills by the securities laws. Even if problems arise, 
the holder’s rights can be enforced through civil litigation. Moreover, the 
overriding rationale for excluding these bills is that they are neither used 
as stock or commodity nor traded in markets; they are rather used as a 
means to facilitate daily transactions. 
Yet, it is not clear why some of these notes or bills mentioned in Article 
3 are not treated as securities. They resemble securities in many ways: 
they are negotiable, they convey rights or interests, they contain a 
promise to pay, and they are used, indirectly, to raise capital. Similarly, 
in the American jurisprudence, this provision is found in Section 3 of the 
1933 Securities Act. There is no apparent theory behind the exemption, 
but it seems that both the Saudi regulator and the American legislator 
took a positivist approach to the exclusion.  
Nevertheless, the important question in practice is how a court of law 
should make the determination as to whether to exclude an instrument or 
transaction from the definition based on the theory behind the exemption 
in Article 3. In Saudi law we do not know, but for an American court 
there is a certain way to make the determination: an American court 
would place a paramount importance on the purpose of the note. If the 
issuer of the note desires to raise money to fund investment schemes or 
commercial enterprises, then the note is likely a security.67 On the other 
hand, if the note is issued in sale transactions to facilitate the cash flow 
or the note is issued to advance consumer good, the note is unlikely to be 
described as security.68 It seems that the CML has followed the American 
positivism in this matter. The article that exempts these papers in the 
CML uses the very wording of the corresponding American article.  
C. OFFER, ADMISSION, AND LISTING IN THE TADAWUL MARKET 
The sale of securities—also called distribution—is mainly regulated by 
two regulations of the Implementing Rules of the CML, namely, the 
Listing Rules and Offers of Securities Regulations. To sell securities, 
companies have to offer them to buyers. Offering is conducted by one of 
two ways: primary offering and secondary offering. The primary 
offering, also known as primary distribution, is the sale of securities by 
the issuing company to the public, usually through an underwriting 
  
Ironically, the CML’s Article that deals with exemptions is Article 3 and the American one is 
Section 3 of the 1933 Act, as well.  
 67. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 52, at 234. See also HAZEN, supra note 52. 
 68. See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 52, at 234. See also HAZEN, supra note 52. 
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agreement between an issuer and broker or dealer.69 This is usually done 
to raise capital because the proceeds of the sale go to an issuing 
company. The secondary offering, termed a distribution, is when the 
seller is not the issuer, but a shareholder or group of shareholders that 
sell a previously issued stock. The proceeds of the sale are not used to 
raise capital; they go to the selling shareholder.  
1. Offer Under the CML  
An offer under the CML is quite different from an offer under contract 
law theory. It is statutorily defined in the Offers of Securities Regulations 
(Offers of Sec. Reg.) to mean “issuing securities, inviting the public to 
subscribe therefore or the direct or indirect marketing thereof; or any 
statement, announcement or communication that has the effect of selling, 
issuing or offering securities, but does not include preliminary 
negotiations or contracts entered into with or among underwriters.”70 The 
securities offer is not just an expression or statement to be bound if 
accepted by the offeree, it is rather broader than that. It is broad because 
traditional offers are governed by time and they must be specific. As 
such, the offeree must decline or accept the offer and what has been 
offered while the parties are still in the muglis al-akad, a vicious place in 
Islamic jurisprudence where the contract is said to be formed. By 
contrast, for a securities’ offer, any direct or indirect marketing 
statement, announcement, or communication that has the effect of selling 
or issuing would be considered an offer. 
The terms “offeror” and “offeree” are also defined by the Offers of Sec. 
Reg. “Offeror” is defined to include the person soliciting an offer or the 
person arranging an offer, which would give rise to the sale of securities 
if accepted.71 “Offeree” is defined to include the recipient of the offer 
and/or his authorized agent.72  
  
 69. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), available at Westlaw BLACKS. 
 70. Offers of Securities Regulations, art. 1 (Saudi Arabia), available at  
http://www.cma.org.sa/En/Documents/OFFERS-OF-SECURITIES-REGULATION.pdf [hereinafter 
Offers of Sec. Reg]. 
 71. Offers of Sec. Reg., supra note 70, art. 4. 
 72. Id. art. 5 
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(a) Types of Offers and the Conditions for Listing 
In 2008, the rules regulating offers of securities were amended.73 Prior to 
the 2008 Amendment, the rules imposed a restriction that securities 
issued by a company in the Kingdom could not be issued unless the 
issuing company was a joint stock company. Now, after the amendment, 
this restriction has been lifted and securities may be offered either 
through public offer or private placement. This means there are two types 
of offering: private and public. A private offering, termed ‘private 
placement’ in the CML,74is made either to the government, to specified 
persons, or to a limited number of persons (those who are well 
acquainted with the affairs of the company such that the company does 
not need to file a registration statement or make a continuous disclosure 
to the CMA with respect to the securities it is about to sell).75 By 
contrast, a public offering is made to the public at large and every aspect 
of it, from advertising to selling, is regulated by the CML and supervised 
by the CMA.   
(b) Definition of Public Offer 
Where invitations to buy or sell securities are not directed toward 
specific persons, but rather open to the public, the offer is said to be a 
public offer. The Offers of Sec. Reg. does not define public offering, it 
simply provides that an offer is public if it does not fall under one of the 
categories of private placement as specified in the statute.76 
The first time an issuer offers securities by public offering and gets listed 
in the Tadawul, the offeror must meet two sets of conditions and 
requirements provided for in the Listing Rules.77 The first set of 
requirements is related to the applicant. This set, mainly, is structured to 
guarantee that the issuer is a scrupulous and stable business. Thus, to 
offer securities, the issuer must: (i) be a Saudi;78 (ii) carry on as its main 
activity, for at least three financial years under substantially the same 
  
 73. CMA Board Resolution, supra note 6, No. 1-28-2008, 17/8/1429H (Aug. 18, 2008). For 
more on the amendment, see Glenn Lovell, Offering of Securities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
36-7, available at http://archive.newsweaver.com/altamimi/newsweaver.ie/altamimi/e_00032146 
000010324064e4.html.  
 74. Offers of Sec. Reg., supra note 70, art. 6. 
 75. For more on private placements, see subsection 3, below. 
 76. Offers of Sec. Reg., supra note 70, art 7. 
 77. Id. art. 8. 
 78. Listing Rules, art. 11(a) (Saudi Arabia), available at  http://www.cma.org.sa/ 
En/Documents/Listing%20rules.pdf [hereinafter Listing Rules]. While the law provides that the 
applicant must be a Saudi company, in practice the CMA has indirectly allowed so-called “swap 
agreements” between non-resident foreign investors and local intermediaries, permitting indirect 
foreign ownership on the bourse.  
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management;79 (iii) publish audited accounts covering at least the last 
three financial years;80 (iv) have management with appropriate 
expertise;81 (v) have sufficient working capital for the 12 months 
immediately following the date of the publication of the prospectus.82   
The second set of requirements or conditions is related to securities. This 
set is put in place to ensure three things: first, alienability of securities; 
second, financial competency of the issuer; and third, the legality of the 
issuance in question. Legality refers to both internal legality, which 
means the issuer is authorized by his bylaws to make the IPO, and 
external legality, which means the offer must comply with the law. This 
set contains seven requirements for securities: 
(i) conform to the statutory conditions in the Kingdom.83 
(ii) be duly authorized according to the requirements of the 
applicant’s by-laws or certificate of incorporation.84  
(iii) there must be at least 200 public shareholders.85 
(iv) at least 30% of the classes of shares that are the subject of 
the application are owned by the public.86 
(v) be transferable and tradable.87  
(vi) The securities must be registered and settled centrally 
through the Depositary Center.88  
(vii) Except where securities of the same class are already listed, 
the expected aggregate market value of all securities to be 
listed must be at least:  
 (1) SR 100 million for shares; and  
 (2) SR 50 million for debt instruments.89 
These are straightforward requirements, but one notable thing about the 
second set of requirements is that paragraph (i) requires that the 
securities must conform to the laws and regulations of the Saudi 
Kingdom. According to this rule, securities could not be offered where 
the company offering them is conducting a business that contravenes 
with the Shari a principles. Shari a principles, generally, prohibit 
  
 79. Id. art. 11(b). 
 80. Id. art. 11(c). 
 81. Id. art. 11(e).  
 82. Id. art. 11(f). 
 83. Listing Rules, supra note 78, art. 12(a)(1). 
 84. Id. art. 12(a)(2). 
 85. Id. art. 13(a)(1). 
 86. Id. art. 13(a)(2). 
 87. Id. art. 12(b). 
 88. Listing Rules, supra note 78, art. 12(c). 
 89. Id. art. 15(a)-(b). 
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dealing in three categories of business: first, usuries business or the 
taking of interest; second, highly risky business, also called excessive 
uncertainty; third, industries that are prohibited per se, e.g., pork, 
weapon, alcohol and money exchange.90 A Shari a Advisory Board 
determines the legality of the transaction from an Islamic perspective. If 
an applicant fails to confirm to (i) or any of the other five requirements, 
his application for enlisting in the Tadawul is in jeopardy.  
(c) Definition of Private Placement 
Private placement is a private offer or an offer that is not open to the 
public. Private offers are not defined, but according to the Offers of Sec. 
Reg. Article 9(a), an offer is a private placement if it falls under any of 
the following categories: 
(1) The offeror is the government or a supranational agency 
recognized by the Authority; 
(2) the offer is restricted to sophisticated investors; or 
(3) the offer is a limited offer.91 
This means an offer to sell government debts or bonds would not be 
subject to the CML disclosure rules or other offer rules. However, this 
does not mean private placements are not subject to antifraud provisions. 
Other statutes not relating to the Tadawul market regulations may fill the 
gap and regulate the offering, distribution or advertising of private 
placements. Additionally, the CMA retains a discretionary power to 
consider an offer that is originally not a private one as a private offer. 
This occurs if the person seeking admission to the market made a request 
and the CMA granted it. The CMA may impose further conditions in this 
case.92 
It is notable that Article 9 of the Offers of Sec. Reg. provides in 
subsections (2) and (3) the terms “sophisticated investors” and “limited 
offer”. Articles 10 and 11, respectively, answer these questions. Article 
10 provides that:  
  
 90. For more discussion on the issues facing the Islamic securities industry, see Dr. Theodore 
Karasike, et. al., Islamic Finance in  a Global Context: Opportunities and Challenges, 7 CHI. J.  
INT’L L 739 (2007); see also Nickolas C. Jensen, Avoiding Another Subprime Mortgage Bust 
Through Greater Risk And Profit Sharing And Social Equity In Home Financing: An Analysis Of 
Islamic Finance And Its Potential As A Successful Alternative To Traditional Mortgages In The 
United States, 25 ARIZ. J. OF INT’L  & COMP. L. 825 (2008).  
 91. Offers of Sec. Reg., supra note 70, art. 9(a). 
 92. Id. art. 9(b). The regulations do not point to any of the requirements the CMA may impose 
in case it decides to consider an offer that was originally not a private one. 
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An offer of securities is restricted to sophisticated investors where the 
offer is directed at any of the following persons: 
1) authorized persons acting for their own account; 
2) Clients of a person authorized by the Authority to conduct 
managing activities provided that: 
a. the offer is made through the authorized person and 
all relevant communications are made through the 
authorized person; and 
b. the authorized person has been engaged as an 
investment manager on terms which enable it to make 
decisions concerning the acceptance of private offers of 
securities on the client’s behalf without reference to the 
client; 
3) the government of the Kingdom, any supranational authority 
recognized by the Authority, the Exchange and any other stock 
exchange recognized by the Authority or the Depositary Centre; 
4) Institutions acting for their own account; 
5) professional investors; or 
6) any other person prescribed by the Authority.93 
According to the Article, the sophisticated investor could be a natural 
person, either a principal or his agent, but must be authorized to conduct 
business in the Tadawul market, e.g., an advisor, single investor and/or 
his agents. A sophisticated investor also includes the professional 
investor which is defined as any natural person who fulfills at least two 
out of three criteria: 
1) he has carried out at least 10 transactions per quarter over the 
previous four quarters of a minimum total amount of Saudi 
Riyals 40 million on securities markets; 
2) the size of his securities portfolio exceeds Saudi Riyals 10 
million; 
3) he works or has worked for one or more year in the financial 
sector in a professional position which requires knowledge of 
securities investment.94  
Moreover, a sophisticated investor could be a juridical person, either a 
public entity such as the Saudi government or any of its agencies, or 
private investment firms. 
  
 93. Id. art. 10. 
 94. CMA Rules Glossary, supra note 19, at 14.  
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Article 11 of the Offers of Sec. Reg. defines the term ‘limited offer’.  It 
determines the circumstances under which an offer may be considered a 
limited one and sets further requirements for treating an offer as limited. 
Article 11 provides three situations that are considered limited offers: 
first, where the offer is directed at no more than 60 offerees, not 
including sophisticated investors, and the minimum amount payable per 
offeree is not less than one million SR or an equivalent amount.95 Here, 
there is a combination of two conditions, both of which must be met by 
the offeror. Second, where the offeree is an employee of the issuer or the 
employee of an affiliate.96 Third, where the offeree is an affiliate of the 
issuer.97 Once securities of the same class are offered as limited, they 
may not be offered again for twelve months. Indeed, the issuer may offer 
as much as he wants from different classes of securities. This is exactly 
what Offers of Sec. Reg. Article 11(b) deals with.98 
2.  Private Placement Notification 
Prior to the issuance of the 2008 Amendment to the rules regulating the 
offer of private securities, the law used to require the issuer to make the 
private placement through a memorandum, called the Private Placement 
Memorandum (PPM). After the Amendment of 2006 to the Offers of Sec. 
Reg., the memorandum requirement was removed and replaced by Private 
Placement Notification (PPN). According to the new rule, Article 12(a) of 
the Offers of Sec. Reg., the CMA must be notified ten days prior to the 
date of offering. There is a specific way to make the ten-day PPN, which is 
to attach the Annex 1 to the Offers of Sec. Reg. In addition, Article 12(a) 
requires the private offeror to comply with several requirements and make 
two additional declarations annexed to the Offers of Sec. Reg. when 
making private placement. The Declarations attest to the accuracy and the 
completeness of the PPN and the advertising documents.  
In sum, to offer securities by private placement the offeror must submit 
to the CMA a package of paper work containing:   
(1) PPN;  
(2) two declarations; and 
(3) offering documents used in advertising.99   
  
 95. Offers of Sec. Reg., supra note 70, art. 11(a)(1). 
 96. Id. art. 11(a)(2). 
 97. Id. art. 11(a)(3). 
 98. Id. art. 11(b) (“Securities of the same class may not be offered as a limited offer under . . .  
this Article more than once in a 12 month period ending with the date of the offer in question”). 
 99. This conclusion is based on the reading of Article 12 of the Offers of Sec. Reg. 
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3.  Restrictions on Privately Acquired Securities 
Under the 2008 Amendment, once securities are sold by private 
placement the offeror is not required to produce or to register with the 
Authority or the Exchange any document relating to the offer of the 
securities, or to inform the Authority of any material developments 
relating to the securities.100 This means there are no continuous disclosure 
requirements. However, while there is no continuous disclosure 
requirement with respect to privately acquired securities, the antifraud 
provisions of the CML are fully operational. Also, the Offers of Sec. 
Reg. restricts the way private placements are advertised. They must be 
advertised to persons to whom a private placement may lawfully be 
made and through an authorized person.101   
Also, Article 17 restricts the secondary market of securities acquired 
privately. The acquirer may not sell these securities, even for private 
buyers,102 except through an authorized person and until meeting one of 
three conditions imposed by the Article: 
(i) the price to be paid for the securities in any one transaction 
is equal to or exceeds one million SR or an equivalent amount; 
(ii) the securities are offered or sold to a sophisticated investor; 
or 
(iii) the securities are being offered or sold in such other 
circumstances as the Authority may prescribe for these 
purposes.103 
The smallest consequence of noncompliance with private placement 
requirements would be disallowing the transaction proposed. Moreover, 
according to Article 18 of the Offers of Sec. Reg., if the private placer 
submitted inadequate information, the CML rules against omission or 
misstatement apply. In addition, the antifraud provisions of Articles 49 
and 50 apply, as well. 
To avoid leaving privately acquired securities in the shadow, the CML in 
the Offers of Sec. Reg. Article 17(e) provides a window for these 
  
 100. Offers of Sec. Reg., supra note 70, art. 16. While there are no continuous disclosure 
requirements, other rules relating to the safety of the market are still applicable. Material 
developments include, for example, failure to inform the CMA about managerial changes, and 
failure to inform the CMA about the decision of the company to stop the operation of a factory for 
maintenance. In at least two cases, the CMA sanctioned listed companies for failure to give notice; 
see Hanware, supra note 47. 
 101. Offers of Sec. Reg., supra note 70, art. 15. 
 102. Id. art. 17(c). 
 103. Id. art. 17(a). 
78
27
Gouda: The Saudi Securities Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2012
142 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT’L & COMP. LAW [Vol. XVIII 
securities and allows them to be listed publicly upon approval by the 
CMA. Indeed, if they are publicly listed, all the restrictions imposed by 
Article 17 are notwithstanding. However, prior to listing they must 
satisfy the requirements of listing, discussed below.  
4. Offer of Merger and Acquisition  
For a listed company in cases of merger or acquisition, Article 5(a) of the 
Merger and Acquisition Regulations mandates that the offeror put the 
offer in the first instance to the board of the offeree company or to its 
advisors. Moreover, to preserve shareholders’ voting rights, if the 
registered company’s securities will face reduction or some of them will 
be cancelled during the merger process, Article 35(d)(1) of the Merger 
and Acquisition Regulations requires the offeror to make public 
disclosure.104 The disclosure is made pursuant to Article 11 of the Merger 
and Acquisition Regulations. The Article provides that public disclosure 
must take place for their own account during an offer period when 
dealings in relevant securities by the offeror or by the offeree and a 
person acting in concert with them. However, subsection (b) of Article 
11 states that if dealing is going on during the offer period, but not for 
the offeror or the offerees’ account, public disclosure is not required. 
Instead, disclosure is required to the CMA, which is a simple 
requirement in that it resembles a notice. According to Article 11(c) of 
the Merger and Acquisition Regulations, during the offer for taking over 
or merger, any person who owns 1% or more of the shares of the 
company has a reportable interest. He must report to the CMA because 
the CMA has a discretionary power as to whether to make the reportable 
interest public.105   
5. Admission into the Tadawul Market 
Prior to the offering of any securities, an applicant must be admitted into 
the Tadawul market. An applicant is admitted if he complies with the 
pre-filing requirements set out in the Listing Rules. First, an entity 
seeking admission must file a Formal Letter of Application and a 
prospectus with the CMA.106 Here, we discuss the other requirements for 
admission and official listing.  
  
 104. Merger and Acquisition Regulations, art. 11 (Saudi Arabia), available at http://www.cma. 
org.sa/En/Documents/Merger%20and%20Acquisition%20Regulations.pdf [hereinafter Merger and 
Acquisition Reg.]. Disclosure is made to the public or to the CMA. It is made to the public if the 
parties are acting for their account, while disclosure is made to the CMA only if the parties are 
acting for their client’s interest. 
 105. Id. art. 11(c)(3). 
 106. The prospectus and it is contents were explained in Part 1, supra. 
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The Letter of Application must satisfy at least eleven of the requirements 
listed in Article 19 of the Listing Rules107 and be submitted with six 
annexes, also called supporting documents. The most important of these 
are Listing Rules Annexes 1, 2, 3 and 6. The first required annex, Annex 
1, is a bit complicated. It must contain information about the shares’ 
ownership, class, total amount paid for issued shares and their value. 
Also, it includes information about the debt instruments, their class, 
  
 107. Listing Rules, supra note 78, art. 19 (“a. An issuer seeking registration and admission to 
listing of its securities must submit an application to the Authority which contains the information 
required under these Rules and pay the fee set by the Authority. b. The issuer must submit with its 
application to the Authority an original copy (or certified where appropriate) of the following 
documents:1) the letter of appointment for the financial advisor; 2) the letter of appointment for the 
legal advisor; 3) the authorisation letters or powers of attorney of the representatives of the issuer 
empowering them to sign the prospectus; 4) a working party list providing the contact details of the 
persons in charge whom are involved with the application at the issuer, the financial advisor and the 
legal advisor; 5) a list containing the names and civil registry numbers (or the equivalent to it for 
non-Saudi nationals) of the directors and their relatives, senior executives and their relatives and 
shareholders; 6) a formal letter of application to registration and admission to listing signed by a 
representative of the issuer in the form set out in Annex 1 to these Rules; 7) a declaration by the 
issuer in the form set out in Annex 2 to these Rules; 8) a declaration and undertaking signed by the 
directors of the issuer and by each proposed director of the issuer in the form set out in Annex 3 to 
these Rules; 9) the draft prospectus in Arabic; 10) all underwriting commitment letters; 11) the 
issuer’s certificate of commercial registration and, where applicable, those of its subsidiaries, or 
equivalent in the case of a foreign issuer; 12) the issuer’s articles of association and by-laws and all 
amendments to date (if any) and, where applicable, those of its subsidiaries; 13) the annual report 
and audited annual financial statements of the issuer and, where applicable, those of its subsidiaries 
for each of the three financial years immediately preceding submission of the application; 14) the 
latest interim financial statements produced since the date of the last annual report and the most 
recent audited financial statements; 15) a report by an external auditor on the working capital of the 
issuer for the 12 month period following the date of the publication of the prospectus; 16) the legal 
due diligence report issued by the legal advisor regarding the application; 17) the financial due 
diligence report regarding the application; 18) a presentation detailing the structure of the issuer and 
its subsidiaries, along with a detailed description of the most recent restructuring of the issuer (if 
applicable); 19) the market study detailing industry information and market trends produced for 
inclusion in the prospectus; 20) the letters of consent from all the advisors on the use of their names, 
logos and statements in the prospectus; 21) a subscription form; 22) a letter from the financial 
advisor and the issuer setting out the disclosure requirements under these Rules which are not 
applicable; 23) a letter from the issuer’s financial advisor in the form set out in Annex 7 to these 
Rules; 24) a letter  from the issuer’s legal advisor in the form set out in Annex 8 to these Rules; 25) 
in the case of debt instruments or convertible debt instruments, a copy of the debenture agreement or 
any other document constituting or securing a debt instrument must be included; 26) an electronic 
copy of all the above mentioned documents (where applicable); and 27) any other documentation as 
it may be required by the Authority. c. Following the approval of the prospectus by the Authority, 
the issuer must submit an original copy (or certified where appropriate) of the following documents 
to the Authority: 1) a prospectus in Arabic signed on every page by the representatives of the issuer 
whom are appointed as authorised signatories; 2) 15 copies of the published prospectus in Arabic; 3) 
15 copies of the English translation of the prospectus; 4) the securities allocation model; 5) the latest 
reviewed interim financial statements (where applicable); 6) all signed underwriting, sub-
underwriting and distribution agreements entered into in connection with the offer; 7) an updated 
and signed letter in the form set out in Annex 1 to these Rules; and 8) an electronic copy of all of the 
above mentioned documents (where applicable). d. The issuer must retain copies of all documents 
required pursuant to this Article for a period not less than five years. e. If the issuer has its securities 
already listed, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Article 11 of these Rules and sub-paragraphs 5), 11), 12), 
13), 14) and 15) of paragraph (b) of this Article shall not apply to the application for registration and 
admission to listing of debt instruments or convertible debt instruments”). 
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number, value, and their redemption value. It shares information with 
Annex 4 and 5, which concern the prospectus and the information 
contained therein. 
Annex 2 is the Issuer’s Declaration. This is a document signed by or on 
behalf of the issuer. The signatory states on it that the issuer has 
complied with what is legally required to be listed in the Tadawul. Also, 
the document explains that the issuer has understood his obligations and 
responsibilities. At the bottom of the document the issuer authorizes the 
CMA to exchange his information with the relevant agencies.  
Annex 3 is the Directors’ Declaration. Every director in the company 
must submit this document. Basically, Annex 3 contains personal 
information about the director, his expertise, address, etc. Information 
about the director’s character and criminal and civil history is also 
requested in this document. At the bottom of the document the director 
declares, but not under the penalty of perjury, that the information 
contained therein is true. Authorization is given to exchange the 
director’s information with other relevant authorities.   
Annex 6 is the Accountant’s Report. This is a lengthy document prepared 
by an independent accountant. It contains information about the 
company’s audited financial statements for the last three years with 
respect to the following:  
1. balance sheet; 
2. income statement; 
3. cash flow statement;108 
Accountants are required to give personal opinion as to whether this 
document reflects a “true” and “fair” view of the financial matters set out 
in it.109 
An applicant who complies with the foregoing requirements can drop his 
application for admission with the CMA after paying the fees. Once the 
complete application (Letter of Application, Prospectus and 6 Annexes) 
is delivered, the CMA reviews it for completeness. The process of 
reviewing the prospectus takes 45 days.110 The Rules do not address cases 
where the CMA does not take action within the 45 day period.111 
  
 108. Listing Rules, supra note 78, Annex 6. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. art. 22(c). 
 111. Id. art. 22(d). 
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However, other rules suggest that the applicant just has to wait, even if 
the waiting period exceeds the statutory 45 days.112 During the review, if 
it appears to the CMA that the prospectus is incomplete, it may require 
the applicant to submit more information or ask him to appear before the 
Authority. Moreover, the Authority may as well initiate its own 
investigation,113 which would cause an inevitable delay in the applicant’s 
approval. Provision 14(d)(4) of the Listing Rules allows the Authority to 
defer the approval of any application as long as delay is necessary. 
During this period, the applicant may be given a chance to be heard by 
the Authority, or be asked to explain any ambiguities in the prospectus. 
In the end, at minimum, the prospectus must comply with Article 42 of 
the CML to be approved.114  
While in the review period, applicants are prohibited, by the CML rules, 
from advertising, offering or selling of any securities until the prospectus 
is approved by the CMA. Under CML Article 1, the prohibition against 
pre-approval communications and activities does not include prohibition 
against negotiations between an issuer and underwriters and contracts or 
memorandums of understanding entered into between the issuer and 
underwriters.115 The rationale behind this is that while pre-approval 
communication might be bad, the law cannot write a blank prohibition 
check against all communications and activities, because issuers and 
underwriters need to work together prior to issuing the stock. But, the 
law also does not want to have a premature buying interest prior to 
approval.116 Accordingly, the exclusion of pre-filing communications and 
negotiations is a matter of striking a balance between these two goals.117 
If an applicant is denied admission, he appeals the denial with the 
Authority to the Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes.118 
A successful applicant is admitted in the Tadawul market; he can make 
an Initial Public Offering and conduct business as usual. However, even 
approved offerings may be withdrawn if they do not find market or 
appropriate demand. For example, the CMA had to withdraw Al-Tayyar 
Travel Group and stop its public offering just hours before the public 
  
 112. CML, supra note 20, art. 41. 
 113. Id. 
 114. CML, supra note 20, art. 45. 
 115. See HAZEN, supra note 52, at 28; see also ROBERT A. FIPPINGER, TIMING ISSUES UNDER 
CONTRACT LAW AND SECURITIES LAW FROM PRELIMINARY OFFICIAL STATEMENT TO CLOSING 
(2006). 
 116. See HAZEN, supra note 52, at 28. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Listing Rules, supra note 78, art. 1(c).  
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offering announcement because demand was weak and investment firms 
paid substantially less than what the Group sought.119  
(a) Registration of Dealing in Securities 
After approval and admission into Tadawul market, all securities must be 
registered with the Securities Depository Center (SDC).120 The SDC is 
tasked with executing the transactions of deposit, transfer, settlement, 
clearing, and registering ownership of securities traded on the Stock 
Exchange.121 Furthermore, liens, claims or encumbrances against 
securities are also registered with the SDC.122 Currently, the SDC is not 
running, but on a temporary basis the Tadawul Company is doing the 
SDC’s job. In the course of registering securities, the SDC is liable for 
negligence or misconduct that results in losses to investors.123 However, 
in cases of contributory negligence or if the error could have been 
avoided, the SDC could escape responsibility.124 Registration is required 
for all securities issued or traded in the Kingdom.  
Registration of the securities neither implies that the Authority has found 
the information disclosed to be accurate nor that the information filed 
with the Authority is complete. The CML, as mentioned earlier, has 
disclaimed responsibility for inaccurate or incomplete information 
submitted by issuers. This means that registration is significant for 
several reasons. First, from a positivist point of view, the significance of 
the registration is that, since the SDC basically functions as a record 
keeper, what is registered on its files is conclusive evidence of 
ownership. Second, unless a company files a registration statement that is 
then approved by the Authority, it cannot legally make the public 
offering.  
As mentioned, registration of securities neither implies that the Authority 
has approved the issue nor that it has found the registration disclosures to 
be accurate. However, registration still means that a person filing false or 
  
 119. See Al Tayyar Cancels IPO in Saudi Arabia (Feb. 21, 2010), available at 
http://www.menafn.com/qn_news_story_s.asp?StoryId=1093306927 (commentators suggest that the 
company was cooking the books to get enlisted in the market). 
 120. CML, supra note 20, art. 26. The rules regulating the operations of the SDC are found in 
CML Section Four. 
 121. At the time of writing of this article, May 2010, the SDC had not been functioning. 
 122. CML, supra note 20, art. 25(a). 
 123. Id. art. 27(g). 
 124. By virtue of CML Article 27(h), the SDC could reduce or even escape responsibility if the 
claimant has contributed to the misconduct or the error committed by the SDC’s employees. Id. art. 
27(h). 
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incomplete information with the Authority subjects himself to the 
antifraud provisions and consequently risks fine or criminal prosecution.   
(b) Disclosure Requirements Under the Securities Regulations 
Transparency and making information available to investors is said to be 
fundamental to the wellbeing of any securities system.125 The CML 
desires to achieve these goals. In Part I, it was noted that the disclosure 
rules require that all material information be disclosed to the public prior 
to offering any securities. This is the same rule that prohibits misstating 
and omitting information from the prospectus. There is certain 
information that must be disclosed to the Authority, outlined in Article 
42 of the CML. It was also concluded that this rule was primarily enacted 
for the benefit of a bona fide investor. In all likelihood, this rule would 
not protect an underwriter who relied on statements provided by an 
issuer. The reason for this could be that, unlike a bona fide investor, an 
underwriter has a duty to independently ascertain the truthfulness of the 
information submitted by the issuer.  
There are two basic issues that must be discussed with respect to the law 
of disclosure. But before discussing these two issues, let us submit that 
what is required to be disclosed in the prospectus and the application is 
the minimum amount of information an issuer is required to disclose to 
the CMA and potential investors.  Some of the information is required to 
be submitted by Article 42, which determines the contents of the 
prospectus. Other information is required in the application and the six 
annexes we discussed above. But we know this is not all the information 
the investor needs to know, in order to make a decision to invest. These 
are the de minimums to comply with law. We also know that the 
prospectus itself is filled with assumptions and predictions or what 
scholars call “soft information”. The question that arises is whether soft 
information is required to be disclosed. It could form material 
information, and if this is the case, then we must answer first what is 
considered material, and second, to what extent the issuer needs to 
disclose. 
(c) Disclosure of Soft Information 
For the purposes of CML Articles 42 and 55, all material information 
must be disclosed in the prospectus. A statement or the omission of a 
statement is considered material “if it is proven . . . that had the investor 
  
 125. See, e.g., Amr Daoud Marar, Saudi Arabia: The Duality of the Legal System and the 
Challenge of Adopting Law to Market Economies, 19 ARAB L. Q. 91 (2004). 
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been aware of the truth when making such purchase it would have 
affected the purchase price.”126 This part of Article 55 of the CML 
captures the essence of the definition of the term material in American 
jurisprudence. American law defines material as “matters to which there 
is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach 
importance in determining whether to purchase the security 
registered.”127 According to this definition, one could say that all the 
information required to be disclosed in the prospectus, listed in Annex 5 
of the Listing Rules, could be considered material. Also, all the 
information required to be reported in the Formal Letter of Application 
and the other five annexes are material for the purpose of the CML. 
Certainly the financial information of the company and items required by 
Article 11 of the Listing Rules are considered material for the investor. 
Apparently, the omission or misstating of these could be considered 
“material” under the CML.  
Consequently, not only is the financial information counted as material 
information, but the American court has gone further than that and 
construed the term material to include professional and personal integrity 
of management.128 This means it is material to state in the prospectus 
whether the persons involved in the writing of the prospectus are 
qualified, honest and have no prior criminal record, etc. The CML has no 
view on this point, but once again it is only logical to think that the 
CML, if it is necessary, will follow the American lead. In fact, there is a 
strong presumption that the CML meant to follow American law because 
it did require the professionals who are involved in writing the 
prospectus to submit some of their personal information, qualifications, 
civil liabilities history and criminal history.129   
Thus, with respect to soft information, in general the CML provisions do 
not require the issuer to give opinion or make speculations as to the 
proposed investment. However, in one instance the Listing Rules 
requires independent accountants to submit their professional opinion 
with respect to the information they are submitting in the Accountant’s 
Report in Annex 6.130 Here, the CML is asking a professional to give his 
professional judgment about matters that are not hard fact. Moreover, the 
prospectus usually contains soft information such as speculation about 
  
 126. CML, supra note 20, art. 55(a).  
 127. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 35 (2d ed. 2003). 
 128. Id. at 36. 
 129. The supporting documents required with the Letter of Application contain information 
relating to the professional’s character and qualification. See, e.g., Listing Rules, supra note 78, 
Annexes 1 & 3. 
 130. Listing Rules require the accountant to state whether the report gives a true and fair view. 
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risk factors, or future projects of the company, the company’s plan of 
operations and the competitive conditions in the company’s industry, 
etc.131  
With the exception of the Accountants’ opinion in Annex 6, the CML, in 
general, does not require the issuer to give projections or any form of soft 
information. However, it is highly desirable that investors get them to 
study their options and make their choices. At the end, the line between 
fact and soft information is thin. In addition, here comes the controversy. 
Under the American law, Rule 175, the issuer is under no duty to provide 
soft information; but if the issuer chooses to do so, the information is 
presumed non-fraudulent and the burden is on the challenger to show 
either that there was no reasonable basis for the statement or that it was 
not made in good faith.132 Moreover, the American law requires that 
management discusses and analyzes known trends and uncertainties that 
could have a material impact on the company’s operations.133 With 
respect to disclosing soft information, the American jurisprudence could 
be summarized as such: you do not have to provide soft information, but 
if you do, it better be good.  
As for the CML, it is not clear how much soft information the issuer 
needs to disclose. The issuer is not required to reveal more than what is 
statutorily required. In other words, the issuer would need to write a 
prospectus containing the information required by Article 42 and the 
information required in the six annexes we discussed above. This is not 
an easy task. A typical prospectus consists of more than a hundred pages. 
An Accountant’s Report could also consist of more than a hundred 
pages. These, coupled with the other requirements the applicant would be 
handling, amount to a tremendous sum of paperwork. Apparently, 
completing the paperwork in the way it is described in the Listing Rules 
should satisfy the minimum required amount of information that must be 
disclosed to all concerned persons.  
Think about a hypothetical case, where the issuer included soft 
information in the prospectus and investors relied on this information and 
bought the stock. It turns out that the projections were not as accurate. In 
addition, it turns out that the issuer’s company plan of operations is not 
  
 131. See, e.g., Sahara Petrochemicals Rights Issue Prospectus (Feb. 17, 2004), available at 
http://www.saharapcc.com/English/MediaRelations/Publications/Documents/SAHARA%20RIGHT
S%20ISSUE%20PROSPECTUS.pdf. (More prospectuses are posted at www.cma.org.) Moreover, 
the CMA Merger and Acquisition  Regulations require listed companies to disclose their intention if 
they are about to merge with or acquire other companies.  
 132. HAZEN, supra note 127, at 36.  
 133. Id. 
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achievable. Moreover, the issuer’s company, unlike what they predicted, 
turns out to be uncompetitive. As a result, a few months after listing the 
company’s stock, stock value plunges and investors lose a tremendous 
amount of money. If the investor relied on the information provided by 
the issuer, he can claim his losses … or he might not recover anything. It 
depends. 
First, to recover in an action, the investor must have relied on the 
information to make his investment decision both under the American 
law and potentially under the CML, under one condition: that the injured 
investor proves that there was no good faith basis for the information.134 
Meaning when the issuer provided the information he had no reasonable 
basis to make such statements or predictions. Here, a successful plaintiff 
would argue that the information is material by virtue of Article 55(a) of 
the CML because he considered or gave them weight in making his 
investment decision. Moreover, although reliance is relevant by the 
wording of Article 55(a), the investor does not have to prove it. 
Accordingly, regardless of whether the information is soft or hard, or 
whether the investor relied on it or not, the fact that it is material entitles 
him to recover his losses. This is all that is required to be proved under 
CML Article 55—materiality. In fact, an injured investor does not have 
to prove the issuer had mens rea, he just has to show that the issuer 
omitted or misstated material information.  
There is another scenario under which an investor might not recover for 
losses sustained as a result of soft information. It depends on the 
language the issuer used in the prospectus. If the issuer provided soft 
information and he warned his investors about the associated risk with 
clear language, he likely won’t be liable under the CML. Claims of fraud 
will not arise under the circumstances and, as such, no action can be 
brought against the issuer. But here is one trick: it is arguable that the 
business of the issuer is highly risky. This is evidenced by the fact that 
all the issuers’ predictions have failed. Highly risky businesses are 
prohibited ab initio in the Saudi Kingdom and apparently they will not be 
allowed in the Tadawul because they are not in conformity with the 
statutory conditions in the Kingdom.135 Assuming that the risky business 
was approved by the CMA and the case turned out to be as described—
failed predictions—the injured investor’s remedy will be rescission of 
the contract status quo ante; parties will be brought as far as possible 
  
 134. Id. 
 135. Listing Rules, supra note 78, art. 12(a)(1) (putting this as a prerequisite to allowing an 
offering of securities in the Kingdom). Statutory conditions require that the dealing be in conformity 
with Shari a law, which prohibits high risk and excessive uncertainties.  
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back to the position in which they were before they entered into the 
contract.  
There are several defenses available to Article 55’s defendant. First, a 
substantive defense available is that the issuer or the person making the 
statement reasonably believed, at the time of making the statement, that 
he had reasonable grounds to make such a statement. The standard to 
determine the reasonableness of the actor’s actions here is measured by 
that of a prudent man in the management of his own property.136 
Affirmative defenses are also available for the issuer in case of an action 
based on violation of the disclosure rule. The first available affirmative 
defense is that the plaintiff knew of the untruthfulness or the omitted 
information. The second is that the information was not material. 
Damages recoverable under Article 55 claims are calculated to cover:  
the difference between the price actually paid for purchasing the 
Security (not to exceed the price at which it was offered to the 
public), (a), and the value thereof as of the date of bringing the 
legal action or the price which such security could have been 
disposed of on the Exchange prior to filing the complaint with 
the Committee,(s) provided that if the defendant proves that any 
portion in the decline in value of the Security is due to causes 
which are not related to the omission or the incorrect statement 
which is the substance of the suit, such portion shall be excluded 
from the damages for which the defendant is responsible.137  
In mathematical terms, a + s=$, where $ = the amount of compensation, 
(a) = purchase price, and (s) = sale price.  
IV. CML REGULATION OF THE TADAWUL MARKET, ISSUERS, 
AND SECURITIES PROFESSIONALS 
The Capital Market Law and the other ten regulations present a 
comprehensive legal framework for the regulation of the securities 
market in the Kingdom. The three principal targets of the CML are 
issuers, exchange or Tadawul market, and market professionals. In 
addition to market and financial regulation, CML regulations impose 
disclosure and other obligations on issuers of securities. The CML also 
regulates issuers and distribution of securities. It requires purchasers to 
register the stock transactions with the SDC. This registration 
requirement is apart from Article 42’s prospectus disclosure, required 
  
 136. CML, supra note 20, art. 55(d). 
 137. Cf., Id. art. 55(e).  
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prior to an IPO. This actually applies to all publicly traded securities in 
the Kingdom.  
The CML also regulates proxy solicitations and insider transactions 
involving companies that are registered or listed with the exchange. 
Listing under the CML, as mentioned, triggers periodic reporting 
requirements. Listed companies are required to submit quarterly and 
annual reports. These reports mostly contain financial information about 
the company, managerial changes, if any, and material developments in 
the company’s investment plans.138 Moreover, reporting is imposed on 
any investor who owns 5% or more of any class of voting shares or 
convertible debt instrument or if the total interest owned by the person 
would increase or decrease the issuer’s shares or debt instrument by 
1%.139 Similarly, a director or senior executive of the issuer who becomes 
the owner of any percentage of the shares or debt must report that to the 
CMA. In all cases, reporting to the CMA must occur at the end of the 
trading day or the day after.140  
A. ANTIFRAUD STATUTE—ARTICLES 49 AND 50 
1. Manipulation—Article 49 
Article 49(a) of the CML is a catchall provision outlawing all actions that 
could possibly affect or manipulate the market or the price of securities. 
It states that 
[a]ny person shall be considered in violation of this Law if he 
intentionally does any act or engages in any action which creates 
a false or misleading impression as to the market, the prices or 
the value of any Security for the purpose of creating that 
impression or thereby inducing third parties to buy, sell or 
subscribe for such Security or to refrain from doing so or to 
induce them to exercise, or refrain from exercising, any rights 
conferred by such Security.141  
This prohibition against manipulation includes all exchange-based 
transactions that give the ostensible impression of active trading, as well 
as transactions entered into for the purpose of depressing or raising the 
price of the securities. Additionally, Article 49(b) empowers the 
  
 138. CML, supra note 20, art. 45. Information disclosed pursuant to Article 45 is confidential 
by virtue of paragraph (c). 
 139. Listing Rules, supra note 78, art. 45(a)(1)-(2). 
 140. Id. art. 45(a). 
 141. CML, supra note 20, art. 49(a). 
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Authority to promulgate rules, define the circumstance and procedures 
aimed at stabilizing the prices of securities offered to the public, and 
define the manner in which and the period during which these actions 
must be taken.  
The CML has pointed to some of the actions that are considered 
manipulative in Article 49(c)(1). These actions include: (1) entering into 
transactions not involving a true transfer of ownership;142 (2) entering 
into transactions simultaneously with prior knowledge that another party 
is about to make a transaction that is substantially the same in terms of 
size and price;143 (3) entering a sale order with prior knowledge that an 
order, substantially the same, has been or will be entered by the same 
person or different parties;144 and (4) taking actions, individually or in 
concert with others to create actual or apparent active trading for the 
purpose of inducing third parties to buy or sell securities.145 Moreover, 
Article 49(c)(2) prohibits pegging, which the act is entered into, 
individually or in concert with others, the purpose of which is to stabilize 
the price of a security.146   
It was mentioned above that Article 49(b) empowers the Authority to 
promulgate rules to define the circumstances that could possibly 
constitute manipulation. In fact, the CMA has exercised this power. In 
2010, in an undated pamphlet, the CMA determined five circumstances 
the act of which constitutes manipulation:  
1. entering orders by investors for the purchase or sale of a 
security with the prior knowledge that an orders is of 
substantially the same size, time and price; 
2. entering an order or orders in order to establish a 
predetermined sale price, ask price or bid price;  
3. entering an order or orders in order to effect a high or low 
closing sale price, ask price or bid price;  
4. entering an order or orders in order to maintain the sale price, 
ask price or bid price within a predetermined range; and 
5. entering an order or orders for a security that are not intended 
to be executed.147 
  
 142. Id. art. 49(c)(1)(a). 
 143. Id. art. 49(c)(1)(b).  
 144. Id. art. 49(c)(1)(c). 
 145. Id. art. 49(c)( 2). 
 146. Id. art. 49(c)(3). 
 147. In fact, these acts are not new rules or legislation; they are already implied in the 
prohibition of manipulation in CML Article 49(c).  
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It is extremely significant to distinguish Article 55 claims from Article 
49 claims. In all likelihood, the defendants under Article 55 are only the 
persons identified by the Article itself, i.e., potentially all the prospectus’ 
writers or signatories. No investor in his capacity as investor can be a 
defendant under Article 55, while under Article 49 the potential 
defendant could be an investor, either buyer or seller, or broker-dealer or 
a substantial shareholder. Moreover, the substantive difference between 
claims based on Articles 49 and 55 is that under Article 55, the plaintiff 
does not have to prove that the defendant has knowledge or intention to 
publish the faulty statement or omit material information. Instead, the 
standard is strict liability and the defendant has a narrow window of 
defense. Under Article 49, proving intent or knowledge is central to the 
plaintiff’s case.  
In an Article 49 claim, the plaintiff has to prove that the issuer or the 
person doing the manipulative activities has done so intentionally. The 
use of the adverb “intentionally” in the Article lays a heavier burden of 
proof on the plaintiff. If the plaintiff cannot prove that the defendant has 
violated the prohibition of manipulation with scienter, or intent, there is 
no chance that he could win his case. Proving intention under the CML 
requires the plaintiff to show that there was scienter, intention, on the 
part of any of Article 49’s defendants.  
2.  Insider Trading—Article 50 
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, the term “insider trading” means 
the use of “material, nonpublic information in trading the shares of a 
company by a corporate insider or other person who owes a fiduciary 
duty to the company.”148 The U.S. Supreme Court has an expanded 
definition that includes misappropriation, which is the act of deceiving a 
person and misusing information that belongs to him from one who owes 
a fiduciary duty to that person.149 According to American jurisprudence 
and the misappropriation theory, it is illegal for a lawyer to trade in 
securities of a company after learning from his client that the client is 
about to take over the company, even though the lawyer owes no 
fiduciary duty to the company.150  
It is no news that insider trading enriches some individuals—those who 
work for the company and their acquaintances and relatives, because 
their intimate knowledge of the company gives them an opportunity to 
  
 148. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 810 (8th ed. 2004). 
 149. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009), available at Westlaw BLACKS. 
 150. Id. 
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trade on nonpublic information. As Hazen has noted, the practice of 
insider trading destroys the integrity of the market and leads people to 
lose faith in the system.151 That is why it is prohibited. CML Article 50 is 
the relevant provision that deals with insider trading. Article 50(a) of the 
CML states that:  
Any person who obtains, through family, business or contractual 
relationship, inside information (hereinafter an “insider”) is 
prohibited from directly or indirectly trading in the Security 
related to such information, or to disclose such information to 
another person with the expectation that such person will trade in 
such Security. Insider information means information obtained 
by the insider and which is not available to the general public, 
has not been disclosed, and such information is of the type that a 
normal person would realize that in view of the nature and 
content of this information, its release and availability would 
have a material effect on the price or value of a Security related 
to such information, and the insider knows that such information 
is not generally available and that, if it were available, it would 
have a material effect on the price or value of such Security. 
The CML did not divert from the standard definition of insider trading. 
However, it uses phrases such as “family, business or contractual 
relation,” which are not necessarily the only ways by which insider 
trading could take place.152 In addition, the CML did not mention in the 
whole Article that the disclosing person-insider has to be a fiduciary 
person. This means the duty not to inside-trade is not just imposed on 
family members or persons who have relation to the insider; it is rather 
imposed on everyone, even upon persons who have no relation to the 
company. This is achieved by using the phrase “any person” in the 
opening of the Article. This is the facial reading of Article 50(a). Article 
50(b) prohibits the selling or purchasing of securities acquired by insider 
means to any person if the seller or the purchaser knows that the 
disclosing party violated the prohibition of insider trading stated in 
Article 50(a). Article 50(b) reads: 
No person may purchase or sell a Security based on information 
obtained from an insider while knowing that such person, by 
  
 151. HAZEN, supra note 52, at 126. For empirical research on manipulation, see Rajesh K. 
Aggarwal and Guojun Wu, Stock Market Manipulation — Theory and Evidence (Mar. 11, 2003), 
available at http://www.afajof.org/pdfs/2004program/UPDF/P306_Asset_Pricing.pdf. 
 152. However, these relations are meaningful in the Saudi community. In all likelihood, if 
insider trading were to take place, it would be through these relations. 
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disclosing such insider information related to the Security, has 
violated paragraph (a) of this Article.153 
First, this is an ongoing prohibition, meaning this prohibition applies 
against the original discloser as well as against persons who later in a 
chain of transactions buy and sell the security in question. Second, while 
50(b) apparently confirms what is stated in 50(a), it uses the gerundive 
“knowing” for the person who is receiving or obtaining the information. 
The use of the gerundive means the seller/buyer of the security must 
have a positive knowledge that the information he is using is leaked by 
an insider. Third, Article 50(b) prohibits the use of inside information, 
but it does not sanction the person who obtained the information but did 
not use it. This is because, as Hazen has noted, insider trading, as a 
violation, is premised on common law fraud and the existence of some 
duty to speak honestly. Silence alone is not actionable; there must be a 
duty to speak.154 He further notes that under American law, possession of 
inside information without more does not create the duty to speak or 
abstain from trading.155 It is also worth mentioning that common sense 
says that there is no prohibition of insider trading if the security, the 
subject matter of the inside trade, is not a tradable security. Article 
4(a)(1) of the Market Conduct Regulations codified this principle.156 
With this reading of Article 50(b), if the recipient of the information has 
no knowledge that the information was leaked by an insider, he is not 
liable if he trades based on the information. Remember that a violation of 
Article 55, non-disclosure, entails only monetary damages. As mentioned 
above, damages are calculated according to the equation: a + s=$. 
However, sanctions for violating both Article 49 and 50 are monetary 
damages and criminal penalties against the violator that could result in 
up to five years imprisonment.157 Also, if the violator is a security 
professional-dealer or broker, his license could be revoked or suspended. 
Moreover, Article 59 of the CML gives the CMA the power to prosecute 
actions against a violator, or a potential violator of any of the CML 
provisions. The penalty for charges brought under Article 59 ranges from 
enjoining the violator by issuing an order to cease and desist from 
  
 153. CML, supra note 20, art. 50(b) (emphasis added). 
 154. HAZEN, supra note 52, at 128. 
 155. Id.  
 156. Market Conduct Regulations, art. 4(a)(1) (Saudi Arabia), available at 
http://www.cma.org.sa/En/Documents/Market%20Conduct%20Regulation-26-8-009.pdf [hereinafter 
Market Conduct Reg.]. The article further elaborates on the term “insider trading” and gives 
examples of acts that are considered insider-trading.  
 157. CML, supra note 20, art. 57(c). Several executives have been prosecuted for violating the 
insider trading law. In all cases the violators were fined, and in two cases jail penalty was attached to 
the sentencing. 
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carrying out the act which is the subject of the suit, to a travel ban, or 
even seizing the property of the violator. According to Article 59(b), the 
CRSD may also impose a fine not less than SR 10,000 and not exceeding 
SR 100,000 multiplied by the number of violations committed by the 
defendant.158 Indeed, in all violations, whether under Article 49, 50, 55, 
56, or 57, the CRSD may order the violator to disgorge any profit made 
illegally.  
Several defenses, not including affirmative ones, are available for 
manipulators and insiders. According to CML Article 58, these two 
crimes are not subject to the statute of limitations. Note that this CML 
statute of limitations is applicable to suits brought under Article 55, 56, 
and 57. Strictly speaking, this means the provision of Article 58 does not 
cover manipulation and insider trading; thus, the affirmative defense that 
the statute of limitations has expired is not available for those two 
crimes. Therefore, substantive defenses must be considered. The central 
substantive defense should be focused on negating intent or knowledge 
because both crimes require either knowledge or intent. A successful 
defendant would argue that he did not have the intention to violate the 
antifraud provisions, but this likely won’t take him far because the law 
authorized the CRSD or the CMA to order disgorgement of the profit 
made from the illegal transaction.  
However, for a convicted insider there is still a chance to avoid jail time 
by requesting to plead Article 64 of the CML. According to Article 64, 
insiders may bail themselves out to avoid imprisonment if they reach 
agreement with the CMA to pay treble the profits they have made or 
treble the losses they have averted by committing the violation.159 The 
payment of the treble damages to the CMA does not relieve the 
defendant from the responsibility to pay compensation to injured 
investors who were harmed by the insider’s violations.160 It is not clear 
whether the bargain to plea provided for in Article 64 is available to 
manipulators. However, the CML does not provide that manipulators 
may bargain to avoid imprisonment. Reason says that as long as this 
bargain is available to insiders, it should be available to manipulators as 
well. 
  
 158. While the CML does not expressly provide for punitive damages, the fines imposed by 
Chapter 10, seemingly, were enacted to play the role of punitive damages. This is so because these 
fines are huge; they range from 10,000 to 100,000 and they are multiplied by the number of 
violations. Moreover, if there is more than one violator in the same company, he is severally liable.  
 159. CML, supra note 20, art. 64. 
 160. Id. 
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B. REGULATION OF SECURITIES PROFESSIONALS 
Securities professionals, primarily, means brokers/dealers—also called 
underwriters—custodians of securities, managers of portfolios, 
arrangers/financial advisors and investment advisors.161 In order to 
conduct business in one of these professions, a company or its agent 
must hold a license from the CMA. The license to practice these 
professions is available for registered, authorized and exempted persons. 
According to the Securities Business Regulations, exempted persons are 
certain government agencies. To be a broker, an entity must be a joint 
stock company that carries on brokerage activities.162 The actual 
individuals who perform the broker’s job are the agents of the joint stock 
company that is licensed to perform brokerage activities. The 
unauthorized practice of the brokerage profession is sanctioned with a 
fine between SR 10,000 and 100,000 and/or an imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding nine months.163 
Article 34 of the CML requires all brokers and their agents in the 
Tadawul market to observe the Exchange’s rules pertaining to the 
regulation of brokers’ businesses. Article 35 empowers the Exchange to 
investigate any broker or his agent to verify whether that broker or his 
agent violated, is violating or is about to violate the law. Moreover, 
underwriters are subject to the rules of disclosure (Articles 40-48) and 
the antifraud provisions (Articles 49 and 50) discussed above.164 
Accordingly, the CMA may prosecute brokers, and the CRSD may 
impose disciplinary sanctions on brokers, monetary fines or even 
suspension of the license for 12 months or permanent revocation.165 
Article 61 of the CML empowers the CRSD to impose similar sanctions 
for the same types of conduct on all securities professionals, including 
brokers and their agents. Not only registered brokers are subject to the 
provisions of Article 61, but also in all likelihood, by virtue of Article 6 
of the Authorized Persons Regulations, potential brokers are subject to 
  
 161. A dealer is one holding himself out as one engaged in selling and buying securities at a 
regular place of business; Cf. LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 52, at 815. In April 2010 the CMA, in 
an undated circular, issued a new definition for finance professional: “any natural person who fulfils 
at least two of the following criteria: (1) he has carried out transactions of a significant size on 
securities markets at an average frequency of at least 10 per quarter over the previous four quarters, 
(2) the size of his securities portfolio exceeds [Saudi Riyals 5 million]; (3) he works or has worked 
for at least [one] year in the financial sector in a professional position in relation to a securities 
investment.”  
 162. CML, supra note 20, art. 32(a). 
 163. Id. art. 60(a). 
 164. Id. art. 62. 
 165. Id. art. 59 & 61. 
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the provision of Article 61 of the CML from the day they submit their 
applications to the CMA.166 
In addition to imposing sanctions arising out of the CML rules, the law 
delegated to the Exchange the power to supervise a broker firm’s 
structure and take measures to ensure its solvency. This is, partially, 
achieved by Article 33, which requires brokers and their agents to meet 
three operational and financial competency standards. The first standard 
relates to the broker’s professional competency. This means the broker 
must be a qualified person to conduct brokering business. The 
requirement is open-ended because there are further other rules that set 
the minimum requirements to act as an agent or a broker. The second 
requirement relates to personal integrity, the person’s moral character, 
honesty etc. The third requirement regards financial competency, 
meaning that a broker must always meet a financial threshold. Until 
2010, the required minimum amount that a broker must always keep in 
his account is 50 million Riyals.  
Sophisticated rules regulating brokers’ businesses and other authorized 
persons’ duties are laid out in the Authorized Persons Regulations. For 
example, Article 5 of the Authorized Persons Regulations, which 
represents a code of professional conduct, makes acting professionally a 
fundamental obligation for all authorized persons. The Article directs the 
authorized persons to act with integrity, to exercise due care and due 
diligence, to act with efficiency and prudence, and to be informative and 
responsive to their clients.167 Article 5 of the Authorized Persons 
Regulations also requires the authorized persons to avoid conflict of 
interest, or in case there is a conflict, to fairly manage it.168 Conflict of 
interest includes conflict among brokers’ own clients and conflict 
between the broker and the client. Additionally, the Authorized Persons 
Regulations impose various fiduciary and professional duties on 
securities professionals. The Regulations require authorized persons to 
form a professional client’s relationship in which the authorized person is 
the fiduciary and thus he must act as one; he must segregate clients’ 
money and act with confidentiality. Article 29 of the Authorized Persons 
Regulations requires the advisors to hold clients’ information in strict 
confidentiality. Disclosure of clients’ information is only allowed in four 
  
 166. Authorized Persons Regulations, art. 6(a) (Saudi Arabia), available at 
http://www.cma.org.sa/En/Documents/AUTHORISED%20PERSON.pdf [hereinafter Authorized 
Persons Reg.] (“For the purposes of these Regulations, an applicant for authorization means the 
person that is applying for authorization to carry on securities business. An applicant for 
authorization becomes subject to these Regulations from the date of submission of his application”). 
 167. Id. art. 5. 
 168. Id.  
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specific situations determined by the Regulations: (1) if disclosure is 
required by law; (2) if the client has consented to the disclosure; (3) if 
disclosure is reasonably necessary to perform a particular service for the 
client; or (4) where the information is no longer confidential.169 Advisors 
are also prohibited from inducing clients or allowing themselves to be 
induced.170 Furthermore, Article 30 of the Authorized Persons 
Regulations requires advisors and managers to establish and maintain 
internal policies and procedures that keep information confidential and 
prevent disclosure.171  
In the context of mergers and acquisitions, if there is an impending offer 
for takeover, Article 6 of the Merger and Acquisition Regulations 
imposes a confidentiality duty on all persons in privy of the sensitive 
information concerning the offer. One significant customer relation but 
also a fiduciary duty imposed on brokers is the duty to “know the 
customer”. This duty requires that a broker knows the client’s objectives 
and is certain that the client understands the risks of investment.172 
Obviously, this duty, in some circumstances, imposes on the broker or 
advisor a duty to warn the client that interest is not warranted and that 
investor might even lose substantial part of his capital or all of it.  
1. Selection of Brokers 
With the exception of the disclosure and antifraud provisions and a few 
ethical rules scattered in the Implementing Regulations, the CML does 
not interfere in the relation of an investor and his broker or advisor. The 
entire regime of the CML contains no provisions relating to the selection 
of brokers or advisors. However, it is useful to explore, briefly, how this 
process plays out in practice.  
Prior to investing in any security, a potential investor usually goes to a 
financial planner or financial advisor to recommend some securities.173 If 
  
 169. Id. art. 29. 
 170. Id. art. 27 (disallowing the taking from or giving of gifts to clients). Authorized persons are 
also required to observe the Anti Money Laundering Statute and other CMA professional 
responsibility rules.  
 171. This is known as a “Chinese wall arrangement”. Chinese wall arrangements may restrict 
the sharing of documents and information between the operations or may require the destruction of 
documents. 
 172. As Hazen explains, this duty “includes, in a discretionary account, that the broker 
understands the clients’ objectives, e.g., financial security as opposed to speculation.” HAZEN, supra 
note 127, at 137. 
 173. “Planner” is not synonymous with “advisor”; as the U.S. S.E.C explains, most financial 
planners are investment advisors, but not all investment advisors are financial planners. Some 
financial planners assess every aspect of a client’s financial life—including savings, investments, 
insurance, taxes, retirement, and estate planning—and help to develop a detailed strategy or financial 
plan for meeting financial goals. While others call themselves financial planners, they may only be 
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the investor decides to invest, an “advisory contract” between the two 
parties is initiated. As Clifford Kirsch explains, the advisory contract 
typically specifies whether the advisor or the client will be responsible 
for selecting the broker. Where the client retains that responsibility—
according to Clifford Kirsch, a situation often referred to as "directed 
brokerage"—and trades, it must naturally be executed by the broker 
selected by the client.174 Kirsch goes on to note that in those cases, the 
contract generally specifies the broker selected by the client (e.g., "the 
client has directed the advisor to direct all brokerage transactions to 
Broker ABC").175 An advisor is required to disclose any potentially 
adverse consequences that may arise with respect to directed 
brokerage.176 Such consequences would occur, for example, if the advisor 
would be in a better position to negotiate brokerage commissions on 
behalf of the client if the client had not chosen the broker.177  
If the advisor assumes responsibility for selecting a broker, the advisory 
contract typically does not specify the particular broker that will be 
used.178 The advisor makes selections throughout the course of the 
client's investment period. In this case, the advisor has the discretion to 
choose different brokers for different transactions.  
V. LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES 
Under the CML, violations of the disclosure rules (Articles 40-48) and 
the antifraud provisions (Article 49-50) may entail administrative action 
by the CMA, civil liability, and criminal sanction. 
A. CMA ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES  
Article 42 represents the minimum items required in a complete 
prospectus. Any prospectus that falls short of complying with Article 42 
is deficient and the CMA may reject any deficient prospectus. Moreover, 
if the prospectus is misleading or incorrect, or if the applicant did not pay 
the fees, the CMA may reject the prospectus as well. When taking such 
an action, the CMA acts as an administrative court and, in accordance 
  
able to recommend investments in a narrow range of products, and sometimes products that aren't 
securities. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Investment Advisers: What You Need To 
Know Before Choosing One (Aug. 20, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/investor/ 
pubs/invadvisers.htm.  
 174. CLIFFORD E. KIRSCH, INVESTMENT ADVISER REGULATION: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO 
COMPLIANCE AND THE LAW (2005). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
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with the CML, due process should be observed. If the CMA is faced with 
an incomplete prospectus, it may request the applicant to submit extra 
information or documents.179 Under such circumstances, the CMA is not 
bound by the statutory 45-day review period. The CMA may take as long 
as necessary to review the prospectus. Alternatively, when faced with a 
materially deficient prospectus, the CMA may flatly reject it.  Prior to the 
Board’s rejection of the prospectus, an applicant may be given a chance 
to be heard. The CMA decisions relating to rejection of a prospectus can 
be appealed to the CRSD.180 For listed securities, in addition to 
proceedings conducted by the CMA under the Listing Rules, Article 59 
of the CML gives the CMA the power to issue cease and desist orders 
and other injunctive relief or suspend the trading of the security in 
question.  
Besides the administrative powers granted to the CMA in Articles 42 and 
59, Article 62 of the CML empowers the CMA to make administrative 
decisions that affect registered and potential brokers and their agents. 
These decisions may include reprimanding the violator or temporarily 
suspending  his license or even revoking it. Article 62(a) calls upon the 
CMA to observe due process when taking administrative measures 
against brokers and dealers, except in urgent cases where the Board may 
suspend the broker’s license without due process for sixty days.181 
B. CIVIL REMEDIES OR PRIVATE ACTIONS 
The CML contains two Articles, 55 and 56, prohibiting misstatements 
and omissions, and two Articles, 49 and 50, prohibiting fraud. All four 
articles create a private right of action, and proceedings brought under 
these articles are initiated at the CMA by either private parties or the 
CMA itself. When the action is lodged by a private party, the plaintiff is 
allowed to bring his meritorious claim in front of the CRSD within 
ninety days of submitting his claim. 
For actions brought under Article 55 for material deficiencies in the 
prospectus, the plaintiff has to claim that the defendant violated any 
article between 40 and 48, which call for an accurate and complete 
prospectus. Article 55, on the other hand, imposes express liability on 
issuers, preparers and signatories of materially misleading prospectuses.  
According to Article 55(a), if the prospectus omitted or misstated 
information and the CMA has approved it, and based on the information 
  
 179. Listing Rules, supra note 78, art. 22(d). 
 180. Id. art. 1(c). 
 181. CML, supra note 20, art. 62(c). 
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an investor bought the stock and sustained damages, he can always 
invoke Article 55(a) and claim his damages from the parties who wrote 
or signed the prospectus. No responsibility lies with the CMA, despite 
the fact that it approved the offering of the stock without ascertaining the 
correctness of the information.182  
The test for invoking Article 55(a) is the materiality of the information; 
the injured party can claim his damages if the misstated or the omitted 
information that caused his losses was “material” and, had the buyer 
been aware of the mistake or the omitted information, he would have 
offered a lower price than what he paid.183 Indeed, the information would 
also have been considered material had the buyer been aware of it; it 
would have prevented him from buying the stock. 
The key phrase in Article 55 is the term “material.” It is not clear what 
constitutes a material statement or material omission.  Article 55 
suggests that this is a question of fact, and if proven that the issuer 
misstated or otherwise omitted material statements, then the buyer is 
entitled to damages because he was unaware, misled or somehow 
deceived into buying the stock. The logic here resembles the logic 
prohibiting ghubn transactions, dealings prohibited in Shari a law.  
Contrarily, between issuers and underwriters, things are different. If the 
underwriter omitted material statements or supplied faulty information to 
the issuer, or the other way around, and in turn these omissions injured 
an investor, the American law has a different standard. In one American 
case between an underwriter and an issuer, the underwriter argued that he 
relied on the information provided by the issuer appearing in the 
registration statement and was therefore justified in relying on the 
issuer's statement.184 The underwriter argued that he even went further 
  
 182. The CMA does not endorse statements by offerors or investors. In more than one 
provision, the CMA disclaims responsibility for approving false or misleading information. The 
main disclaimer for what is provided in the prospectus is found in CML Article 48(b).  
 183. CML, supra note 20, art. 55(a) (“In case a prospectus, when approved by the Authority, 
contained incorrect statements of material matters or omitted material facts required to be stated in 
the prospectus, the person purchasing the Security that was the subject of such prospectus shall be 
entitled to compensation for the damages incurred by him as a result thereof. A statement or 
omission shall be considered material for the purposes of this paragraph if it is proven to the 
Committee that had the investor been aware of the truth when making such purchase it would have 
affected the purchase price”).   
 184. Escott v. BarChris Const. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). This case was 
extensively analyzed by scholars; see, e.g., Ernest L. Folk, III, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal 
Securities Acts: The BarChris Case Part 1—Section 11 of Securities Act of 1933, 55 VA. L. REV. 1 
(1969).  See also Ernest L. Folk, III, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The 
BarChris Case Part 2—The Broader Implications, 55 VA. L. REV. 199 (1969); Jennifer O’Hare, 
Institutional Investors, Registration Rights, And The Specter of Liability Under Section 11 of The 
Securities Act of 1933, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 217 (1996). 
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and verbally asked the issuer and the issuer answered him.185 The 
underwriter claimed that based on the verbal affirmation he got from the 
issuer he acted. The court rejected this argument. The court said that the 
underwriter must make reasonable attempts to verify, “independently”, 
the information contained in the registration statement.186 Consequently, 
the takeaway from this case is that the rule requiring the disclosure of all 
material information would not protect an underwriter; it is enacted to 
protect bona fide investors.  
Furthermore, compared to the antifraud provisions, Article 55 imposes 
broader liability on all persons who signed or prepared the prospectus, 
because the complainant/buyer need only show that he bought the 
security and there was a material misrepresentation in the prospectus. 
There is no requirement under Article 55 that the buyer shows that he 
relied on the information. It is noted that Article 55 corresponds to 
Section 11 of the U.S. 1933 Securities Act. As Hazen has noted, with 
respect to the American law under Section 11, there are two standards of 
liability imposed. The first is on the issuer, who generally is strictly 
liable once the claimant has proved that he bought the stock and that 
there was a material misstatement in the prospectus. The second standard 
of liability under Article 55(b) applies to non-issuers, 
brokers/underwriters, boards of directors, advisors, accountants, etc. 
Similarly, with CML Article 55(b), there are two standards of liabilities. 
First, under 55(b)(1), an issuer is liable irrespective of whether it had 
acted reasonably, or whether it was aware of the incorrect statements in 
connection with material matters, or of the omission of material facts that 
should have been disclosed in the prospectus.187 Article 55(b)(1) seems 
iron clad, structured to make the issuer strictly liable. The issuer cannot 
relieve himself except by using affirmative defenses. There are three of 
these defenses available to the issuer: 
(1) buyer knew of the untruthfulness or omission in the 
prospectus at the time of purchase; 
(2) immateriality of the information; or 
(3) Taqadum, expiration of the limitations period. 
The second standard of liability under Article 55(b) applies to non-
issuers, those persons identified in Subparagraphs (2)-(5) of Article 
55(b). These persons may raise defenses not available to issuers; two 
  
 185. Jennifer O’Hare, Institutional Investors, Registration Rights, And The Specter of Liability 
Under Section 11 of The Securities Act of 1933, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 217 (1996). 
 186. Id. at 218. 
 187. CML, supra note 20, art. 55(b)(1). 
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additional possible affirmative defenses are provided for in Article 
55(c)(1)(2). The first defense relates to someone who, after reasonable 
investigation and on the basis of reasonable grounds, is convinced that 
part of the prospectus was not in violation of the disclosure rules.188 The 
second affirmative defense available to non-issuers relates to someone 
who had no reasonable ground at that time to believe that the part of the 
prospectus in question contained what could be deemed a violation of the 
disclosure rules.189 “Reasonable ground” is understood according to 
Article 55(d), which establishes the appropriate standard of reasonable 
care: the standard required of a prudent man in the management of his 
own property.190 Note that this does not mean the three affirmative 
defenses available to an issuer are not available to non-issuers. 
There could be the third affirmative defense available to principals and 
investors, but also this provision might apply to issuers as well. 
According to Article 20 of the Market Conduct Regulations, in the event 
that an investor or any person acting as his agent, broker, or dealer 
violates the antifraud and the disclosure provisions, that person—not the 
actor—is liable unless (1) he takes reasonable steps to prevent the 
violation and (2) he did not authorize the acts in question.191  
In suits for damages brought under Article 55(a), compensation depends 
on whether the security is sold prior to the date of the judgment. The 
significant dates are the dates of sale (if the security has been sold prior 
to the lawsuit), the date the lawsuit is filed, and the date of the 
judgment.192 If the security is sold before the filing of the suit, damages 
are calculated to cover the purchase price minus the price for which it is 
sold. If the security is sold between the date the suit is filed and the date 
of judgment, the plaintiff is entitled to either (1) the amount paid minus 
the price for which the security sold, or (2) the amount paid minus the 
value of the security at the time the suit was filed, whichever is less. If 
the security is held until the date of the judgment, the plaintiff is entitled 
  
 188. Id. art. 55(c)(1) 
 189. Id. art. 55(c)(2) 
 190. Id. art. 55(d) (“In determining that investigation shall be deemed reasonable or what shall 
constitute reasonable ground for belief for the purposes of paragraph (c) of this Article, the standard 
of reasonableness for the purpose of this Article shall be that of the prudent man in the management 
of his property”). Hazen calls this the “due diligence duty”. HAZEN, supra note 127. 
 191. Market Conduct Reg., supra note 156, art. 20. While the Market Conduct Regulations 
seem to be a code of professional conduct, mostly, they are as binding as the CML because most of 
their provisions are explanation, reinstatement, and elaboration of the CML provisions. 
 192. Cf., HAZEN, supra note 127, at 63. 
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to the amount paid less the value of the security at the time the suit was 
filed.193 
It is notable that CML Article 55 and other statutes impose due diligence 
on non-issuers, but they are not actually pointing to any factors to be 
considered in determining whether or not the conduct of a person 
constitutes a reasonable investigation or a reasonable ground for belief 
meeting the standard set forth in Article 55(d) of the CML, which 
requires the actor to act with due diligence. The American jurisprudence 
has dealt with this aspect. It points to several factors that must be 
considered in determining the due diligence required. Some of these 
factors are to be found in the SEC Rule 176, which include: 
(1) the type of issuer; 
(2) the type of security; 
(3) the type of person; 
(4) the office held when the person is an officer; 
(5) the presence or absence of another relationship to the issuer 
when the person is a director or proposed director; 
(6) reasonable reliance on officers, employees, and others whose 
duties should have given them knowledge of the particular facts 
(in the light of the functions and responsibilities of the particular 
person  with respect to the issuer and the filing); 
(7) when the person is an underwriter, the type of underwriting 
arrangement, the role of the particular person as an underwriter, 
and the availability of information with respect to the registrant; 
and 
(8) whether, with respect to a fact or document incorporated by 
reference, the particular person had any responsibility for the fact 
or document at the time of the filing from which it was 
incorporated.194  
Nevertheless, as Hazen points out, these are not the only determinative 
factors; other factors may also be considered,195 such as special expertise 
the person in question might have. This means SEC Rule 176 is not 
conclusive; it is only a guideline to make the call. Hazen further notes 
that courts emphasize that this matter is to be resolved on a case-by-case 
basis.196 
  
 193. Id. at 64. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
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C. LIABILITY UNDER ARTICLES 55 & 56 
Article 55 applies in cases where securities are sold by means of 
prospectus. This means the statement that was omitted or untruly stated 
is in writing, i.e., statute of frauds. In such a case, liability is joint and 
several on all the signatories of the prospectus. Moreover, the Article 
seems to suggest that there must be privity of contract between the 
injured person and the defendant. The plaintiff in such a suit is likely an 
investor or advisor who has sustained losses because of omissions or the 
untruthfulness of a statement in the prospectus. The defendant in this suit 
is “all” or any of the persons identified in Article 55(b). However, 
underwriters of the public offering are not liable under Article 55(b) 
beyond the proportionate amount of securities they have underwritten or 
the amount of securities they have distributed, whichever amount is 
greater.197 
Article 56 applies when securities are sold and the omitted or false 
statement is made orally or in writing. The Article is broader than Article 
55 because it covers oral communications and it does not require privity 
of contract between the defendant and the plaintiff, but the plaintiff must 
prove that: (1) he was not aware that the statement was omitted or 
untrue;198 (2) either he would not have purchased or sold the security in 
question had he known that information was omitted or untrue, or he 
would not have purchased or sold such security at the price at which such 
security was purchased or sold;199 and (3) defendant had knowledge of 
the fallacy of the information or was aware that more likely than not the 
information disclosed, omitted, or misstated a material fact.200 Damages 
under Article 56 are the same damages awarded according to the 
prescription of Article 55(e) discussed above.  
D. CRIMINAL LIABILITY UNDER ARTICLES 49 & 50 
Articles 49 and 50, known as the antifraud provisions, impose criminal 
sanctions on any person who fraudulently violates the CML. Article 49 
outlaws manipulative acts. Manipulative acts are identified by the Article 
as acts that are intentionally done to create a false or misleading 
impression as to the market, the prices, or the value of any security for 
the purpose of creating that impression or thereby inducing third parties 
to sell, buy or refrain from exercising any rights conferred by the security 
in question. From Article 49, it seems that the CML meant to categorize 
  
 197. CML, supra note 20, art. 55(b)(4). Damages under Article 55 were covered in Part III.  
 198. Id. art. 56(a)(1). 
 199. Id. art. 56(a)(2). 
 200. Id. art. 56(a)(3). 
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all manipulative acts in three broad groups: (1) acts designed to create 
false or misleading impressions of existing active trading; (2) acts 
designed to create actual or apparent active trading to induce third parties 
to buy or sell or to refrain from doing so; and (3) interfering with the 
market by pegging or making an order to sell securities with prior 
knowledge that a substantially similar order has been made, in terms of 
size, price and time. The prohibition of these three main categories is 
mainly against trade-based manipulations, meaning these prohibitions are 
mostly valid for listed securities while they are actively traded. In all 
likelihood, any act, even if not mentioned in the Article, constitutes 
manipulation if it falls under any of these categories. Several activities, 
the commissions of which constitute manipulation, are outlined in the 
Article.201 Further, the Article sanctions manipulative activities whether 
they are done by a single actor or done in collaboration with others. 
Unlike Article 50, the CML did not provide that the jail penalty imposed 
by Article 49 can be avoided by paying treble the profit made or treble 
the losses averted. In practice, the Authority has not shown that it is keen 
on criminal prosecution under Article 49. Few cases were filed against 
violators. As of April 2010, only one or two persons were imprisoned 
and no one had ever been sentenced to the five years’ imprisonment 
penalty provided for in Article 57(c).  
On account of Article 50, insider-trading works against the seller and the 
buyer on the condition that the person using the inside information knew 
that the information he used to trade had been obtained through an 
insider.202 The prohibition of insider trading is not just confined to the 
immediate seller and the immediate buyer; it applies to successors if they 
know that the information has been obtained through inside means. 
Moreover, Article 50 prohibits the disclosure of the inside information to 
another person if the person disclosing the information expects that the 
person might trade on securities based on the information he obtains. 
This means that for a person to avoid violating the inside trading rule, the 
insider has to know the people around him, for whom they work for, and 
to whom they might reveal the inside information.  
A question arises as to how the recipient of the inside information would 
know that the information is illegally obtained. The test for knowing 
what constitutes inside information is provided in Article 50(a); it is the 
reasonable man standard. A reasonable man, given the nature and the 
content of the information, would realize that this information is not 
  
 201. Id. art. 49(c). These acts were discussed in Part III. 
 202. Id. art. 50. 
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available to the public and if it were available, it would have a material 
effect on the price or value of the securities.  
From the standard set by the Article, it seems that the law anticipated the 
user of the inside information to be quite knowledgeable about the rule 
against insider trading. But in reality, what will happen in a chain of 
transactions originated by acquiring inside information? For example, in 
a typical case of insider trading A, an insider, disclosed information to B, 
an investor. B may not use the information to trade or else he would be 
violating Article 50. If B discloses the information to C, assuming that C 
knew that B received the information illegally from A, C cannot use this 
information. This means there does not have to be a relation between the 
original discloser/insider and the person using the information. As long 
as C knew that the information was originally obtained by an insider, he 
cannot use it. Likewise D, E, etc., down the chain of users are prohibited 
from dealing based on this information.  
Victims of violations of Article 50 may sue at the CRSD through the 
CMA. Damages awarded are similar to those of Article 49 damages. In 
addition to heavy monetary fines, which resemble punitive damages, jail 
time may also be added to the sanctions of Article 49 violators.203 
However, by reaching a settlement with the CMA for the payment of 
treble the benefit realized or the losses averted, violators may avoid jail 
time.204 
VI. CONCLUSION  
The Capital Market Law and its implementing statutes are a very 
sophisticated body of rules. They are much needed in the Kingdom’s 
rapidly growing economy. The Saudis wealth is estimated to be well over 
55 Billion Riyals in 2009, which is about 15 trillion US dollars. With the 
ability to regulate this wealth, the Saudi capital market was ranked just 
behind Germany and ahead of Taiwan in 2009. These are extraordinary 
achievements given the fact that this law kicked-in only in 2003 and still 
some of the CMA offices are not fully functional. That being said, with 
the exception of the rules that prohibit certain non-Islamic dealing, one 
must note that the CML, almost in its entirety, transplanted from the 
American system. The provisions are identical; the language is the same 
  
 203. In August of 2009, it was reported that for the first time, the CRSD imprisoned an investor 
for violating the rule against insider trading; see Saudi Bishah Chairman Sentenced to Three Months 
Jail For Insider Trading, SECURITIES DOCKET, Aug. 18, 2009, available at http://www. 
securitiesdocket.com/2009/08/18/saudi-bishah-chairman-sentenced-to-three-months-jail-for-insider-
trading.  
 204. CML, supra note 20, art. 64. 
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and the bureaucratic structure is the same. And while the American 
system has evolved in the last nine decades, the CML leaves behind a 
wealth of jurisprudence and scholarship that guides judges and decision 
makers in regulation of the market, and it is still evolving.  
More importantly, the American system itself is still developing because 
of the stare decisis system. On the other hand, in the Saudi system, the 
prospect for natural development is bleak despite its novelty. The Saudis 
have no written jurisprudence in this area. Moreover, even in other 
commercial and business law areas, there is no meaningful 
jurisprudence. Judges have to rely on antiquated fiqh books.205 It would 
have been a good opportunity to make the CML dispute subject to the 
jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts in the Kingdom. This way, hopefully 
after a few years, the law would develop and grow. Now that disputes 
concerning the CML are only adjudicated at the CMA, one tends to think 
that the CML makers deprived it from naturally developing. Therefore, 
the only path left for the CML to develop is through the CMA decisions 
which were rendered by bureaucrats and appointed officials, some of 
whom have no knowledge on the science of law. Even the CMA path 
seems bleak because the CMA decisions are not reasoned, not grounded 
in jurisprudence or logic. They were rendered in a sentence or two and 
not published as precedent and—if they are even published—they have 
no precedential value according to the Saudi legal system.  
 
  
 205. Books that contain ancient Islamic jurisprudence. 
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